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Our one-hundredth issue 
The first issue of TAPOL Bulletin appeared in August 1973. 
Seventeen years later, on our own special 'centenary', it is 
a good moment to reflect on what we have been doing and 
where we go from here. 
In 1973, there were mapy tens of thousands of political 
prisoners or tapols (tahanan politik) in Indonesia. Several 
hundred had been given severe sentences in show-trials 
staged to back General Suharto's claim that he had foiled a 
'communist coup attempt' in October 1965. All the others 
had been detained for almost a decade with no prospect of 
a trial, or of release. During the 1970s, pressure for the 
release of the tapols became so strong that when economic 
disaster blew up in Suharto's face and he needed more 
military aircraft to bomb the East Timorese .into submission, 
he had no option but to free the untried prisoners, making 
it easier for his backers in the west to step up the supply Of 
much needed economic aid and military equipment. Our 
own role was acknowledged when the regime held a press 
conference to discredit us and announced that the word 
tapol which we had adopted as our name, should no longer 
be used. 
Although a campaign was launched by then editor Derek 
Davies, in the pages of the Far Eastern Economic Review, 
to . force us to close down (our main aim - to release the 
untried prisoners - had, after all, been achieved!), we saw 
no reason to stop, or even to stop caJJing ourselves TAPOL. 
By now, student activists were in prison, getting their own 
dose of JIJSt~ce' in Suharto's anti-subversion courts. The 
older generation of tapols returned home, only to discover 
that release did not mean freedom. To this day, they are 
social pariahs, the victims of a system of persecution that 
wiJl dog them till their dying day, unless pressure can force 
the regime to rehabilitate them totally and unconditionally. 
Having crippled the 'extreme left' opposition, the regime 
turned its attention to the 'extreme right', the Muslims, of 
whom many hundreds are now sjtting out long pr.ison terms. 
But this was not all, by a long chaJk. West Papua had 
suffered ferociously under Indonesian military occupation 
since 1963, with military operations and massacres forcing 
people to take up arms, or flee to Papua New Guin~a. East 
Timor had been bombed beyond recognition, the population 
uprooted and atrocities were the daily fare of the people. As . 
everyone soon , discovered, . human rights violations were 
p3.f1icular1y violent in Indonesia's colonial •.enitories. 
During the 1980s, new problems arose m the wake of 
accelerated economic growth and the concentration of 
wealth and resources in the hands of conglomerates, many 
of them run by or closely tied in with the country's First 
Family. Our decision in 1986 to expose the damaging social 
and environmental impact of transmigrating millions of 
poor peasants from Java to the outer reaches of the 
Republic was ~mly the start of a widening focus on land 
rights abuses and other atrocities associated with 
'development', not only among tribal peoples but also in the 
Javanese heartland. 
Today, the apparatus of repression is unchanged though 
Kopkamtib has given way to Bakorstanas. But in the 
Indonesia of the 1990s, that is only part of the problem. 
The victims of today's abuses suffer at the hands not only 
of the military and army-backed government officials; there 
are the multinationals, the projects funded by the World 
Bank and Indonesia's own tycoons despoiling forests and 
spewing out effluent, while government pays lip-service to 
environmental protection. Continued on page 14 
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FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
RI and China restore ties 
China and Indonesia will restore d.iplomatic relations this month, ending a 23-year rift between East 
Asia~ two most populous nations. To seal the new relations Prime Minister Li Peng will visit Jakarta 
this month, while President Suharto wants to pay a visit to Beijing in November, after attending the 
coronation of the new emperor of Japan. 
The restoration follows prolonged negotiations following a 
meeting between China's Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and 
President Suharto in Tokyo in February 1989. From then on 
it was just a matter of solving outstanding difficulties to 
pave the way for the resumption of the relations. 
Brief history 
Ties between the two countries were first seriously dis-
cussed in 1954 when negotiations were held about dual-
nationality for Chinese living in Indonesia who still retained 
their Chinese citizenship. In 1955 a treaty on this complex 
matter was signed in Bandung. Then at the 1955 Afro-Asia 
conference, Indonesia and China · joined ranks for the first 
time to develop a third bloc which much later emerged as 
the Non-Aligned Movement. Jakarta-Beijing relations 
became very close particularly during the · Guided Democ-
racy of President Sukarno from 1959-1965. Sukarno visited 
China three times, while Chinese leaders like Zhou Enlai 
and Liu Shaoqi paid several visits to Jakarta. But imple-
mentation of the dual-nationality concept did not proceed 
well. In particular the racist PPlO government decree in 
1960, preventing Chinese from trading below district level 
led to protests from the Chinese government. Tens of 
thousands of petty Chinese traders and shop-keepers lost 
1 their livelihood, causing major social upheavals. In foreign 
affairs, China was one of the few to support Sukarno's 
move to quit the UN. 
The killing of the six generals on 1 October 1965 drasti-
cally transformed the relations. Soon after the generals 
blamed the PKI for the murders, alleging it was part of a 
coup attempt, China was accused of supporting the PKI. 
Mobs attacked Chinese government premises in Jakarta; the 
Chinese consulate was ransacked, followed by an attack on 
the Xinhua office which later served for many years as a 
camp for political prisoners. On 15 April 1966, a right-
wing mob attacked the Chinese Embassy compound, 
whereupon the relationship plunged to zero. Both sides 
expelled personnel and in October 1967, diplomatic ties 
were severed. 
Outstanding issues 
The many Chinese nationals living in Indonesia as 
unwanted aliens could still disrupt relations. The Indonesian 
government says there are 300,000 ethnic Chinese who 
previously held Chinese passports and need to be taken care 
of, and who have been given special ID cards. It is still 
unclear whether they are entitled to apply for Indonesian 
citizenship. After the Tien An Mien massacre, it is unlikely 
that many of these will be willing to go to China. 
The other murky issue was Beijing's support for the many 
PKI refugees in China. For many years, President made it 
a condition that unless China withdrew its support for the 
The grounds of the former Chinese embassy, now derelict 
and used as a parking lot. 
PKI, relations would not be resumed. But now this problem 
has been resolved as hundreds of PKI refugees have left 
China, leaving only a few sick and elderly people. Since the 
Tokyo meeting in February 1989, the Chinese government 
has insisted that it has no more links with the PKI and has 
promised not to interfere in internal Indonesian affairs. 
Although the Indonesian government has always insisted 
that China played a role in the so-called 'coup attempt' of 
1965, no evidence has ever been produced. Ali Alatas has 
in tum promised not to isolate China in the international 
community. As an earnest of that pledge, Indonesia has 
supported China at the UN against condemnation for the 
Tien An Mien massacre. 
The other issue is Indonesia's debt to China. Indonesia 
agreed on 3 July to repay US$84 million. 
The rapprochement has been coordinated personally by 
President Suharto and his office. In the army, many officers 
still se~ China a~ a communist threat and regard the 
restoration of relations as bad news. By contrast, Vietnam 
has never been seen as a threat by the armed forces. It was 
no coin~idenc~. _that, while Ali Alatas was busy mending 
fences m Be11mg, armed forces leaders were hosting 
General Vo. Nguyen G~ap on a ~isit to Jakarta. The generals 
may have mtended this as a sign of their disapproval of 
Suharto's rapprochement with China. * 
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Revelations in CIA' s hidden history 
In May many US papers published a syndicated report by Kathy Kadane about the involvement of US 
embassy personnel in Jakarta in the 1965/1966 massacres in Indonesia. Ms Kadane's investigations 
have added another piece to the jigsaw of what happened in Indonesia in 1965. The Kadane story 
which was taken up in the Indonesian, Dutch, Australian and UK media, has given a new impetus for 
an examination of the role of the leading actors in the 1965 coup and massacre. It should also lead 
to official inquiries by the US Administration and Congress. · 
Kathy Kadane's report was fust published on 19 May in a 
South Carolina paper,the Spartanburg Herald Journal. Next 
day, it made the front pages of the San Francisco 
Examiner, the Baltimore Evening Sun, the Miami Herald, 
the Raleigh News and Observer, Boston Globe and the 
Chicago Tribune while the Washington Post, North Jersey 
Herald News and The Seattle Times ran shorter versions. 
Ms Kadane, a stringer for the Washington-based States 
News Service (SNS), started working on her report in the 
early eighties when, as an investigator for the deputy chief 
counsel to the Watergate committee, she came across the 
death list story. While studying at the Columbia School of 
Journalism, she compiled a 700-page chronology of the 
massacre. Apart from smaJI grants from the Fund for 
Investigative Journalism and Essential Information, Ms 
Kadane has financed the research herself. For the sake of 
truth, democracy, humanity and justice, this breakthrough 
may mean that, after nearly a quarter of a century, a proper 
account can at last be given. 
Robert Martens, the key figure? 
Akey figure in Ms Kadane's story is Robert Martens, who 
was on the staff of the political section of the US embassy 
at the time. He told her he had been compiling a list of 
national, regional and local functionaries of the PKI, the 
Indonesian Communist Party, for two years. The lists were 
given to the Indonesian army through an intermediary, at a 
time when the embassy was weJI aware that the army was 
killing communist suspects in large numbers. "It really was 
a big help to the army. They probably killed a lot of people 
and I probably have a lot of blood on my hands", Martens 
is quoted as saying. 
His Indonesian counterpart was Tirta Kentjana Adhyat-
man, an aide of Adam Malik, then minister of trade under 
Sukarno. Like Martens, Adhyatman was · coJlecting PKI 
names for his boss and has confirmed his connection with 
Martens in several interviews. They exchanged information 
and checked their lists with each other. Adam Malik passed 
on the lists to the KOSTRAD headquarters of Major-
General Suharto. But Adhyatman claims 'it is not true to 
say that I received lists of names from Bob (Martens). He 
had his list and I had mine'. [Jawa Pos, 28 May 1990]. 
Senior army officers in Indonesian military inteJJigence at 
the time were quick to respond to the Kadane report. Lt. 
General (ret'd) Sutopo Yuwono was not surprised to read 
about Martens'list of PKI members. "In those days, in 1965, 
Protest · against CIA 
involvement in 1965 ldllings, 
in front of US consulate, 
Amsterdam. 
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exchange of information was quite common with every-
body, with foreign powers - like emb~ies - and between 
ourselves" [Editor, 2 June 1990). Sutopo Yuwono was head 
of BAKIN, Indonesia's military intelligence, in the early 
seventies. But one of his deputies, Major-General (ret'd) 
Nichlany put it differently: "They (the US embassy) didn't 
do anything at all. They didn't provide us with any data at 
all! On the contrary, the Americans were quite amazed that 
Indonesia was able to wipe out the largest communist party 
in Asia after China. All the data about the intelligence 
operation to destroy (the PKI) was in our hands." Nichlany 
was quite specific about who was in charge. "I know 
precisely that it was Pak Harto of KOSTRAD who carried 
out the obliteration of the PKI." [Jawa Pos, 26 May 1990). 
Admiral (ret'd) Sudomo echoed this, insisting that 
Indonesian intelligence knew it all. 'It was common knowl-
edge, and it is logical that we had sufficient information 
about the communist party and Communist members" 
[Indonesia Times, 25 May 1990). 
Marshall Green, the US ambassador at the time, had a 
rather different account. "I know we had a lot more infor-
mation (about the PKI) than the Indonesians themselves", 
he told Kadane. Martens kept a pool of all the data about 
PKI personnel from different parts of the embassy, includ-
ing the CIA station. But the very idea that the army needed 
help from a foreign power for its own drive against the PKI 
has raised the nationalistic hackles of many officers who 
want to take all the credit for the killings. While Kadane 
makes it clear that the US embassy contributed substantially 
to the destruction of the PKI, most Indonesian army 
officers, whether retired or still on active duty, resent this. 
Only Sutopo Yuwono, never close to the core of officers 
around Suharto, admits that information was being passed 
to the army from various embassies. 
There is no suggestion that Martens was on the CIA 
payroll. The CIA station at the US embassy in 1965 was in 
the hands of Hugh Tovar and Joseph Lazarsky, chief and 
deputy chief of the station. Hugh Tovar who served in 
Jakarta from 1958 till 1966, a critical period when Sukarno 
was turning increasingly against the West, is not mentioned 
in Kadane's report. As the archetypal CIA agent, Tovar has 
been involved in past controversies about the CIA role in 
1965. He always denies everything and would no doubt 
give false testimony under oath. As in the recent Irangate 
scandal, such people see lying as essential to any covert 
operation, a patriotic duty. The more talkative Lazarsky told 
Kathy Kadane: "We were getting a good account in Jakarta 
of who was being picked up ... They (the army) didn't have 
enough goon squads to zap them all, and some individuals 
were valuable for interrogation. The infrastructure was 
zapped almost immediately. We knew what they were 
doing. We knew they would keep a few and save them for 
the kangaroo courts, but Suharto and his advisers said, if 
you keep them alive, you have to feed them". By the end 
of January 1966, Lazarsky said, the checked-off names -
monitored in Jakarta and at the CIA intelligence directorate 
in Washington - were so numerous that it was clear the 
PKI leadership had been destroyed. 
Soon after the Kadane story appeared, Martens and 
Lazarsky started to denounce it. Tirta Kentjana Adhyatman 
even denied having been interviewed by her. Ms Kadane, 
who according to Village Voice, has produced a report of 
Pulitzer quality, has all the interviews on tape and could put 
the last nail in the coffins of these people. 
When were lists exchanged? 
Ms Kadane's article does not say when Martens and 
Adhyatman had their frequent rendezvous, only that it 
happened over "a number of months" . The exact time is 
crucial in assessing whether the US embassy and the CIA 
were directly involved in planning the overthrow of 
Sukarno and the obliteration of the PKI or whether the CIA 
was 'merely'involved in the massacre of at least 500,000 
alleged communists. Lazarsky gives the impression that the 
'shooting list' was only used during the massacre i.e. after 
1 October 1965. Checked-off names meant that these PKI 
leaders had been killed or captured. Former CIA Director 
William Colby, who was CIA Far East Division Chief, told 
Kadane, 'We came to the conclusion that with the sort of 
Draconian way it was carried out, it really set them" - the 
communists - "back for years". After the killing of the six 
generals on the morning of 1 October 1965, the PKI was 
immediately blamed and the persecution started. 
Former President Sukarno and US Ambassador Green 
While there is enough evidence of CIA involvement in the 
PKI bloodbath through direct support to Major-Genera] 
Suharto, the KOSTRAD HQ and the red berets, evidence 
about whether the CIA had a relationship with Suharto prior 
to the killings of the six generals is still inconclusive. Some 
pieces in the jigsaw are still missing, most of the evidence 
now available point to Suharto as the main actor both in the 
30 September events and the massacre. 
The CIA study 
It is generally asserted that the CIA Directorate of Intelli-
gence has produced only one study about 1965, lndonesia-
1965: The Coup That Backfired, written in 1968. This 
study, recommended by people like Hugh Tovar as a 
balanced and thorough analysis, was declassified in the 
seventies and released through the Document Expediting 
Project of the Library of Congress. Needless to say, it 
contains no hint of CIA involvement in the 1965 affair. In 
the past few years, CIA watchers, experts on US foreign 
policy and Indonesianists have raised doubts about this 
document. In 1975 a former Canadian diplomat, Peter DaJe 
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Scott, published an account of US involvement in 1965 and 
argued that US policy-makers knew in advance about the 
planning of a military takeover, facilitated it, took credit for 
it when it occurred and even publicly exhorted the military 
to displace Sukarno in Quasi-official US publications. 
['Exporting Military-Economic Development: America and 
the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965-1967' in Ten Years 
Military Terror in Indonesia, Spokesman Books, 1975]. He 
argued that the US preparations for a military takeover in 
Indonesia were too large ana too public to be confined to 
only one agency, the ClA. A whole range of institutions -
the US army, the oil industry, Ford Foundation, the Council 
of Foreign Relations, in short, the very cream of the US 
political and intellectual establishment were part of it. He 
cogently describes the overt activities but produced no 
conclusive evidence about CIA tentacles in the 1965 affair. 
Some CIA watchers believe that the declassified ClA 
study was a sanitised version of a more lengthy CIA report 
on Indonesia. Ex ClA-agent Ralph McGehee has stated on 
several occasions that such a report does exist. 
From 1973 through early 1977 I was the CIA's 
East Asia division representative to the Interna-
tional Communist Branch (/CB). My duties 
included custodianship of studies prepared ·by the 
/CB that examined communist strengths and 
weaknesses and described CIA operations against 
various communist parties. Its study about the 
agency's operation in Indonesia in 1965 was so 
heinously fascinating that I read it many times. It 
boastfully outlined how a simple covert operation 
had been decisive in des~roying the PK! [Harper's 
Magazine, December 1984}. 
This suggests that the covert operation described by 
McGehee was not confined to compiling a 'shooting list'. 
A recent study of US foreign policy reveals that US 
documents for the three months preceding 30 September are 
still withheld from public scrutiny. Gabriel Kolko argues: 
'Given the detailed materials available before and after 
July-September 1965, one can only assume that the release 
of these papers would embarrass the US government.' 
[Confronting the Third World, US Foreign Policy 1945-
1980, Gabriel Kolko, Pantheon Books, 1989]. The cable 
traffic between US ambassador Marshall Green and Secre-
tary of State, Dean Rusk provides damaging proof of US 
complicity. Kolko reveals that on 28 October 1965, 
Marshall Green cabled Secretary of State Dean . Rusk that, 
despite President Sukarno's efforts to stop the slaughter, the 
"cleanup" of the PKI would go on. The Secretary of State 
replied the next day that this 'campaign .against PKI' must 
continue, because 'the military are the onJy force capable of 
creating order in Indonesia.' A few weeks later, Indonesian 
generals approached the United States for equipment 'to arm 
Moslem and nationalist youths for use in Central Java 
against the PKI.' Washington responded by supplying covert 
aid, dispatched as ~'medicines"; 
Kolko summarises the massacre as follows: 
The ''final solution" to the Communist problem in 
Indonesia was certainly one of the most barbaric 
acts of inhwnanity in a century that has seen a 
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great deal of it; it surely ranks as a war crime of 
the same type as those the Nazis perpetrated. No 
single American action in the period after 1945 
was as bloodthirsty as its role in Indonesia, for it 
tried to initiate the massacre, and it did everything 
in its power to encourage Suharto, including 
equipping his killers, to see that the physical 
liquidation of the PK! was carried through to its 
culmination. 
Hugh Tovar vehemently denies the existence of the fuller 
ClA report mentioned by Ralph McGehee. It is the word of 
one man against another. Tovar embodies the spirit of an 
intelligence officer, while McGehee turned against the ClA 
after realising the murder, horrors, cheating and lying 
perpetrated by the ClA in Vietnam. There is every reason 
to believe McGehee. As a former agent, Ralph McGehee 
still has to seek approval for everything he writes from the 
ClA's Publications Review Board. An article he wrote in 
1981 about the successful ClA operation to overthrow the 
Sukarno government was spattered with deletions. 
Killings in Central Java in 1965 
What now? 
The Kadane article has provided a new opportunity to draw 
attention to US involvement in the 1965 massacre in 
Indonesia. The first official reaction came from the 
spokesperson for the White House, Margaret Tutweiler, who 
denied US complicity and asserted .. that it was not US 
policy to hand over such lists. If such things did occur, she 
said, it could have been done by individual members of the 
embassy, without the consent .of the higher ranking func-
tionaries at the embassy. Robert Martens wrote to the 
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Washington Post, using the same language; he admitted 
passing PKl names, but said, 'I and r alone decided to pass 
those 'lists' to the non communist forces. I neither sought 
nor was given permission to do so by Ambassador Marshall 
Green or any other embassy official.' [Washington Post, 2 
June 1990]. 
Pressure has been growing in Washington for the appro-
priate congressional committee to investigate the US role, 
on the basis of Ms Kadane's revelations. In a statement 
issued on 21 June, Asia Watch called on the Bush adminis-
tration to 'conduct its own investigation into the American 
role with a view toward fully disclosing the extent of 
embassy and CIA involvement before and after the coup 
took place. All government documents relating to these 
events should be declassified. And the Bush administration 
should cooperate fully with any Congressional hearings that 
may be held to examine the role of the US in Indonesia in 
LAND DISPUTES 
1965-66 and the lasting impact on the human rights 
situation there.' 
According to the New York Times [12 July], the House of 
Representatives Intelligence Committee is planning to carry 
out such an investigation. Reporting this, the paper pub-
lished a lengthy article based in part on transcripts of Ms 
Kadane's interviews. The general thrust of this report 
appears to be aimed at undermining the credibility of her 
account; indeed, this newspaper has been criticised for 
failing to carry the Kadane story when it was first released. 
It is likely that intense lobbying is under way in 
Washington to make sure that the truth about 1965 is kept 
hidden, with the Indonesian embassy certain to be actively 
involved. A thorough investigation would not only unearth 
more evidence about the US role; it would also serve to 
focus on the massacres and the crime against humanity 
perpetrated by Suharto and his subordinates. * 
Kedung Ombo villagers sue Governor 
Fifty-four people from Kedungpring, Nglanji village in Kemusu sub-district, are suing the Central 
Java government for Rp 2 billion in compensation for land, buildings and crops lost to the World 
Bank-fu.nded Kedung Ombo dam. They say the Central Ja~a authorities violated regulations by taking 
land belonging to them without prior agreement. They want land near the dam and priority rights to 
fishing and opportunities in tourism arising from the dam, before well-heeled speculators move in. The 
villagers are represented by a team of lawyers from the Legal Aid Insitute (LBH). 
Objectivity? 
Governor Ismail said the villagers were perfectly within 
their rights to bring the matter to court - a normal thing in 
a state based on the rule of law - and declared himself 
ready to face his accusers. He does have strong reason to be 
confident: the government has never Jost a court case yet. 
In a bid for more objectivity, the lawyers representing the 
villagers pointed to the amount of attention focused on the 
Kedung Ombo case, both from within Indonesia and from 
abroad. An appeal for fair play was also submitted by 
members of the Foundation for the Defence of Human 
Rights (LPHAM) at the first session at court in Semarang 
on July 5. To this the chief judge responded that such 
appeals were unnecessary, since even-handed justice is 
carried out anyway, in a state based on pancasila and the 
rule of law. If such 'even-handed' justice has allowed the 
government to win each time until now, the outcome of the 
Kedungpring villagers' suit must already be decided. 
District and subdistrict heads accused 
Objective or not, lawsuits will soon be plaguing the Central 
Java government as hundreds more villagers are said to be 
preparing their cases. One already in the pipeline is a suit 
to be filed by 22 villagers from Kedung Ombo, assisted by 
the LBH, against the Boyolali district head, Lt. Col. Hasbi, 
and Kemusu subdistrict head, Daryatmo. The plaintiffs are 
demanding Rp 1 billion compensation and the rehabiltation 
of their good name, after their identity cards were stamped 
with 'ET' (ex-tapol). Hasbi and the Kedung Ombo project 
leader are accused of intimidation. Hasbi expressed 
astonishment that a case was being prepared against him, 
saying that all problems with the dam in Boyolali had been 
resolved. 
Intimidation 
In April, hundreds of villagers from Sragen protested 
outside the Department of Home Affairs in Jakarta for just 
compensation . . [see TAPOL Bulletin 99] The following 
month ten protestors returned to Jakarta to report on the 
intimidation and interrogation the participants were 
subjected to on their return home. They also told members 
of the House of Representatives how a teacher, Sutono, 
employed by Muhammadiyah, the Muslim social and 
welfare organisation, had been suspended for taking part in 
the protest. The head of Sragen Muhammadiyah said the 
teacher's involvement in motivating the masses and in the 
Jakarta protest were clearly unsuitable for a Muhammadiyah 
teacher. He denied the suspension of Sutono had any link 
to a reprimand from the Sragen district head over Sutono's 
be~viou~. Students from Yogyakarta Muhammadiyah 
Umvers1ty who oppose the suspension, appealed to the 
central · leadership of Muhammadiyah to reverse the 
decision. Muhammadiyah should guarantee freedom of 
opinion, written or spoken, of its members, they said. ~ 
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Tensions mounting in Aceh 
In July, armed forces commander General Try Sutrisno celebrated /dulAdha (Muslim Day of Sacrifice) 
in Aceh. It is customary for the commander to spend festive days in trouble-spots; spending Christmas 
in East Timor is part of the tradition. General Sutrisno visited Aceh with the Police Chief, General 
Mochammad Sanusi, and North Sumatra's military commander, Major-General H.R. Pramono. 
Growing tensions in· the last two months are clearly the background to the general's trip to Aceh. 
General Try Sutrisno urged the people of Aceh to support 
national unity. Speaking in Lhokseumawe, the capital of 
North Aceh district, where the upheavals are concentrated, 
General Sutrisno said any effort to split national unity and 
sabotage development would be punished by God (sic). 
Indonesian press reports confirm that the general's visit was 
aimed at calming things down after a series of attacks and 
incidents between the army and members of GAM (Gerakan 
Aceh Merdeka, the Free Aceh Movement). The army avoids 
the term GAM and refers to it as GPK (Gerakan Pengacau 
Keamanan, Security Disturbance Movement). After six 
months of mounting tension and clashes between the army 
and GAM, the atmosphere has now reached boiling point. 
Conflict escalates 
The revival of the Acehnese nationalist movement has come 
as no surprise [see TAPOL Bulletin, Nos 94 and 99). A 
combination of factors has given the movement new 
impetus after several years of 'hibernation'. Non-govern-
mental sources report lately that Teuku Hasan di Tiro, the 
Acehnese leader in exile, has organised military training for 
dozens of platoons of Acehnese youngsters in Libya; many 
of these recruits are now back in Aceh, waging a guerilla 
war against the Indonesian military. 
Earlier this year, armed units started using hit-and-run 
tactics, attacking isolated military and police posts. There 
have been many casualties and. each time, the armed units 
have got away with a stock of weapons including semi-
automatic M16s and crates of ammunition. As many as 200 
modern weapons were seized from the Indonesian armed 
forces during this period. 
Some attacks have been graphically described in the press. 
On 28 May, troops were performing civic duties (ABRI 
masu/c desa, ABRI into the village) in Kuta Makmur, North 
Aceh. A minibus stopped, 9 persons dressed in white 
stepped out and started firing at the troops, using brand-
new M16 rifles. Three people were killed on the spot, 
including an innocent by-stander. The rebels left, taking the 
weapons of the army unit. Later, the same group attacked 
the local Koramil, (military district command) also in Kuta 
Makmur. The army retaliated and at least two battalions 
were flown in from Java. The local people have been the 
victims of the army's presence. In several districts, people 
are afraid to leave their homes at night. The entire eastern 
highway from Medan to Banda Aceh has become a chain 
of checkpoints. People are constantly being house-searched, 
body-searched and ordered to show their identity cards. 
GAM units have meanwhile escalated their actions and 
attacked several checkpoints. It was clear that a real war 
was going on. Indonesian soldiers began to feel uneasy at 
the frequent ambushes and their high casualties so thought 
up the tactic of shedding their uniforms and wearing T -
shirts and sarongs. At the same time, house searches and 
patrols along the highway continued. In April and May, 
several nasty incidents occurred. Innocent civilians 
travelling by motorbike or car were halted by armed men 
dressed in sarongs. Confused by the situation, local resi-
dents became panicky and decided not to stop . when 
summoned, only to be killed by the soldiers. Now. the 
troops have been ordered to wear uniform again and check-
point posts are clearly identified as Bakorstanasda. This 
security command was set up in September 1988 to replace 
the notorious Kopkamtib, the Command for Security and 
Order. The new body is not supposed to engage in oper-
ational duties except in an emergency. By using this 
designation for army posts, Aceh has evidently reached a 
state of crisis. 
LNG plant in Arun, Aceh 
On 4 June an ABRI unit attacked a house in Langsa, 
allegedly a rebel headquarters. After an exchange of fue 
and victims on both sides, the army entered the house. Two 
days later, in a show of force, Indonesian troops paraded 
along the streets with the corpse of a rebel, heading towards 
the dead man's family home in the village in Binta. On the 
way, the parade was ambushed and three soldiers were 
killed. In retaliation, on 18 June, soldiers are reported to 
have killed six rebels. 
Another dimension of the conflict is the threatened 
position of thousands of Javanese transmigrants. On two 
successive days, buses carrying Javanese transmigrants as 
passengers were ambushed. Fourteen casualties were repor-
ted, apparently in retaliation for the behaviour of Indonesian 
TAPOL Bulletin No. 100, August 1990 7 
iACEH 
soJdiers in the vi11ages. The victims were a11 empJoyed on 
state plantations in North Aceh. Conflicts between the 
transmigrants and 1oca1 people have become more frequent. 
On 31 May, a clash occurred between the inhabitants of 
RambongJup, a new transmigration site in East Aceh, and 
the Jocal peopJe. The Acehnese threatened to bum down the 
new vmage and the newcomers had to ask the army for 
protection. Many transmigrants are now abandoning the 
sites and fleeing to Medan despite caJJs from the local 
military commander to stay put. The transmigrants say they 
fled after leaflets were spread, telling them to ]eave Aceh 
by 6 July. [Kompas, 9 Ju1y] An estimate of fifty people, 
military and civilians, have been killed in the last few 
weeks and there are no indications that the conflict will 
cease. 
General Try Sutrisno in Aceh, surrounded by security 
guards. 
Economic boom creates social disparity 
Other factors have also provoked conflict between the Joca] 
population and the Indonesian authorities. In the Jast ten 
years, the eastern and northern part of Aceh have been at 
the centre of an industrial boom. The discovery of the Arnn 
natural gas field in 1971 has changed the social complexion 
of the eastern coast of Aceh. A huge LNG (liquefied natural 
gas) complex in Lhokseumawe plus linked industries has 
transformed the population pattern. Industrialisation has 
attracted niany outsiders with most jobs in hi-tech pJants 
like Arnn reserved for qualified engineers and managers 
from elsewhere. The new professionals Jive in fenced-off 
compounds, with their own shops, schools, hospitals and 
golf-links. The Arnn plant, known by the initials PTA, has 
earned the nickname, 'pantang terima orang Aceh' or 'never 
employ Acehnese'. [The Indonesia Times, 19 December 
1989] 
The Arun LNG plant is not the only industry. In the last 
few years, many other industrial plants have emerged along 
the north-east coast. They include PT Kertas Kraft Aceh, 
part owned by the Suharto family with an output of 165 
thousand tons of cement-bags a year. The Kraft factory, 
one of whose major share-holders is Bob Hasan, a Chinese 
entrepreneur closely linked to Suharto, is widely resented 
locally; in May, an attempt was made to bum it down but 
the press was warned not to report the incident. Other new 
installations include PT Aceh Asean Fertilizer and another 
giant fertiliser plant, Pabrik Pupuk Iskandar Muda. Only the 
latter plant has agreed to employ unquaJified local people. 
There are many pockets of armed rebellion in the three 
north-eastern districts. The three districts: Pidie, Aceh 
Utara and Aceh Timur are precisely the places where the 
new industries have been established. 
These deveJopments have Jed to a sharp contrast between 
the north-east and conditions in the western part of Aceh, 
Jess affected by industrialisation. In the east, the population 
density at 105/km2 is five times that in the west. The 
eastern part is aJso traditiona1Jy the agricultural centre of 
Aceh. In the transmigration boom of the eighties many 
Javanese transmigrants were settled there, some of them 
employed in state-run coconut plantations. 
Reactions in Jakarta 
The Jakarta authorities seem unable to handle the explosive 
situation in Aceh. In May, armed forces commander 
General Try Sutrisno warned the press for its reporting 
about Aceh, which he classified as 'subversive'. But anned 
forces information officer, Brigadier-General Nurhadi, took 
a different tack, asking the press to help the authorities by 
reporting developments in Aceh 'in a positive light'. Two 
months Jater, the press is indeed reporting the situation 
almost daily, apparently without getting into troub1e. 
Although the Libya connection is fairly obvious, anned 
forces spokesperson Brig. General Nurhadi insists that the 
'gangs' are crimina] and that Libya has nothing to do with 
them. He recognises that acknowledging a Libya connection 
would give credibility to the 'gangs' whereas he argues that 
they are 'obscure'. The newly appointed commander of 
North Sumatra (which inc1udes Aceh), Maj. General 
H.R.Pramono has also branded the rebels as gerombolan 
(wild gangs). Ca1ling them a gerakan would mean they are 
a well-organised movement. Both generals refuse to 
acknowledge that GAM has political motives, describing 
them as bandits. Yet even reports in the Indonesian press 
indicate that the armed units are targetting their activities 
against army posts. Indonesian press reports refer to them 
always as 'kriminal murni' (purely criminal) but by reading 
between the lines, it is not difficult to understand what is 
really happening. 
The names of some rebel leaders have surfaced, in 
particular an ex-soldier, Surya Darma or Robert, who 
joined the army in 1982; he defected and was dismissed in 
1986. So far the army has not been able to track him down. 
But in July another rebel leader, Yusuf AB., was reportedly 
ki1led while resisting arrest, in a military raid in North 
Aceh. The Indonesian army needs this kind of success to 
compensate for the many casualties sustained in the past 
few weeks, for fear that demoralisation might spread among 
the troops and have a 'domino effect' in the other regions. 
On 9 July General Sutrisno told parliament of successful 
army raids against the GPK. From April ti11 June, 50 people 
were arrested, and weapons and documents were confis-
cated. He described security conditions in Aceh as satisfac-
tory claiming that the army had localised and isolated the 
armed groups. Two days later, however, the governor of the 
province announced after a meeting with President Suharto 
that more troops would be sent to Aceh. There was a need, 
he said, · for a greater armed forces presence to mix with the 
population and strengthen their resiJience against the 
'trouble-makers'. Although General Sutrisno had claimed 
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that calm had been restored, the governor named districts in 
north and east · Aceh where things were far from calm. 
[Kompas, 12 July] 
The ganja connection 
Another angle widely covered is ganja, or marihuana. 
Ganja is a traditional herb that has been used for gener-
ations in Aceh. Since the seventies the ganja trade has 
grown, following the hippie trail of young tourists to Kuta 
Beach and Pattaya Beach. Anti-drug operations were 
mounted by the police in 1988 and 1989, confiscating 80 
tonnes of top-quality marihuana. The authorities claim that 
local dissatisfaction originates in part from the fact that 
many ganja fields were destroyed. The Acehnese insist that 
the ganja trade is in the hands of non-Acehnese backed by 
the army. 
Their grievance against Jakarta goes much deeper. Aceh 
and its four million people have always had a troubled 
relationship with Jakarta. Although Aceh is called a 'special 
region', the Acehnese know that special status means 
nothing. The huge profits from the Arnn gas fields, 
exported to Japan and Taiwan, all flow to Jakarta. The new 
governor, Ibrahim Hasan, Acehnese himself, managed to 
increase the Aceh budget fourfold in 1990, to combat the 
impression that Jakarta takes and never gives. 
CEH 
The old Indonesian slogan, 'from Sabang to Merauke' has 
taken on a new meaning. It is in those regions, along with 
East Timor, that rebellion now threatens rule from 
Jakarta. * 
ACEH 
CENSORSHIP 
A thousand books 
'unsuitable for schools' 
Nearly a thousand books have been classified as being 
unsuitable for use in schools. The new regulation issued in 
July by the Department of Education and Culture sent 
shockwaves through the publishing world and in bookshops 
throughout the country. Seventy-nine publishing houses are 
affected by the decree. 
Akthough the regulation falls short of banning the books, 
it is seen as a blatant attempt to censor books available to 
the general public and to teachers and pupils alike, at 
primary and secondary schools. Bookshops are strongly 
influenced in their purchasµtg by the schools market and 
are unlikely to stock anything that school-children and 
teachers have been told not to buy. 
The list of 'unsuitable books' includes many titles by 
well-known Indonesian academics as well as a recently-
published book, Sewindu . Dekat Bung Karno (Eight Years 
in the Company of Bung Kamo) by Bambang Widjarnarko 
whjch depicts the late President Sukarno in a sympathetic 
light and insists that he knew nothing about the plan to 
kidnap and murder General Yani and other senior army 
officers in October 1965. Widjarnarko, a naval officer, was 
personal aide to Sukarno during the years before and after 
Suharto seized power in 1965. The book has become a 
best-seller and has been re-printed several times. 
The other titles mentioned widely in the press (given here 
only in English) include Creative Dimensions of Philosophy 
by Professor Conny R. Semiawan (who was responsible for 
the translation into Indonesian of a book on sex education 
for small children which was banned in 1988), Challenges 
in the World of Education by Pastor Dr. BS Mardiatmadja, 
Modern Indonesian Poetry by Ajip Rosadi, Dukun Siladri 
a Balinese people's tale by Karkono Kamajaya and An 
Architect discusses Indonesian Architecture by Ir. Eko 
Budihardjo. 
When some academics responded in amazement to this 
new-style book-burning, saying that their books were not 
even intended for use in schools, a spokesperson for the 
Department said that 'unsuitability' also applies to books on 
the book-shelves in schools, intended only for teachers. 
The criteria in compiling the list, he said, include 'contents, 
language and security'. [Tempo 14 July 1990] * 
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WEST PAPUA 
Freeport in hot water over Indonesia 
Freeport Indonesia, the copper mining company which has been plundering the wealth of West Papua 
for almost two decades, is in the middle of a row with students at the University of Texas at Au~tin 
over a $1 million study agreement between the company and the university s department of geological 
sciences. Freeport is undertaking a US $500 million programme to double copper production and triple 
gold production over the next few years, and is negotiating a new contract with the Indonesian 
government which will increase the company s concession area by a staggering 25, 000 square 
kilometres. Going on Freeports past record with the local landowners, this expansion spells disaster 
for the indigenous people whose land lies in the area. 
The US $1 million deal between Freeport Indonesia, 85.4% 
subsidiary of US-based Freeport McMoRan Copper, and 
the University of Texas (UI), is a 10-year geological 
survey project funded by the company and conducted by 
staff and students from UT and the Bandung Institute of 
Technology, in West Java, as well as Freeport personnel. 
The project will fust look at Freeport's Gunung Bijih 
contract site and then spread along the mountain range. It 
is likely that this expanded area will coincide with the new 
25,000 sq km exploration area, which in tum is believed to 
include the earthquake-tom traditional land of the Hupla 
people. The Hupla are currently being subjected to a 
government programme of coercive resettlement to a site in 
a lower-lying area to the north of their mountainous 
homeland, ostensibly 'for their own safety' [see TAPOL 
Bulletin No 98, April 1990]. 
Hupla man [Photo: Owen Jelpke] 
Freeport Indonesia has donated US $25,000 to the 
earthquake relief fund, but it is not clear whether the money 
was used together with government relief funds, as a tool 
to coerce the Hupla into resettlement. It would be the height 
of irony if Freeport, whose activities at Gunung Bijih lead 
to the disastrous resettlement of the Amungme people, were 
found to be directly involved in the similarly coercive 
resettlement of the Hupla - especially if this apparently 
humanitarian act concealed an interest in the area's mineral 
wealth. TAPOL has received no reply to a letter addressed 
to Freeport McMoRan, urging the company to ascertain that 
its donation was not put toward the resettlement scheme. 
TAPOL has also written an open Jetter to the President, 
staff and studeqts of UT, urging them to suspend the 
agreement with Freeport until the ethical implications of 
their institution's involvement in the project have been fully 
considered. The letter pointed out that Freeport has been a 
bastion of support for the Suharto regime helping to 
confirm Indonesia's presence as the colonial power in West 
Papua. It mentioned the past and potential future environ-
mental impact of the mine - Freeport McMoRan is number 
one water polluter in the US - and suggested that 
"Staff and students at the University should con-
sider whether they wish to actively condone the 
continued violation of the rights of the Amungme 
people and the violation of more land rights of 
indigenous people which will follow the expan-
sion". 
A group of graduate students at the UT have written their 
own letter to the University authorities. They are calling for 
the University to withdraw from the Freeport project, and 
to recognise West Papua as an independent state. 
West Papua's minerals on offer 
West Papua, along with Maluku, Sulawesi, Nusa Tenggara 
and East Timor, is included in the region defined by the 
Indonesian government as Eastern Indonesia, current focus 
of Jakarta's 'development' efforts. The large-scale exploita-
tion lined up for the region has as its centrepiece the capital 
intensive minerals industry for which it needs to attract 
foreign investment. The mineral wealth of the region, 
sweetened by tax and other incentives, is now being offered 
to the world's mining elite. Excepting oil and gas exploita-
tion, Freeport is still the only mining company at produc-
tion stage in the territory. But this may soon change. 
Ingold, member of Canada-based Inco mining group, is 
exploring for gold in the Oksibil area near the border with 
Papua New Guinea. If a mine is developed, the inevitable 
encroachment on lands belonging to the local Ngalum tribe 
would seriously disrupt their land-based way of life. Just 
acr?ss !he oord~r in ~~G, the Ok Tedi gold mining project 
which is dumpmg tailmgs on the Fly River and poisoning 
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the local peoples' fish, serves as a grim foretaste of what 
could be in store for Oksibil. 
In the Bird's Head region of West Papua six companies -
one UK joint venture and five Australian joint-ventures -
are exploring for gold in an area totalling over two million 
hectares. According to official data, there are 27 other 
minerals available in West Papua, including coal deposits 
in Bintuni subdistrict, and chromium, bismuth, copper, 
marble, mica, nickel and uranium in Manokwari district. 
The many oil companies in the region include US-based 
Conoco whose destructiori of local resources in Kalimati 
village, Bintuni district, lead to violent reprisals by local 
people. Conoco also has exploration concessions in the 
central highland region which overlaps with the Lorentz 
National Park. According to a report in the Far Eastern 
Economic Review, [November 30, 1989], the company is 
exploring "potentially vast" onshore oil reserves near Tiom, 
west of the Baliem Valley. 
West Papua's wealth has been exploited by outsiders for 
outsiders ever since it was discovered. The profits alone 
from the gold produced at Freeport's mine - on which it 
pays no taxes - were enough to enable the company to ride 
out a slump in copper prices in the seventies. And gold is 
supposedly a mere by-product of the copper. Now the 
WEST PAPUA 
company is the largest corporate tax payer in Indonesia 
with current net annual profits estimated at about US $100 
million. Moreover, Freeport need no longer be bothered by 
rebel attacks about which vice president Craig Saporito said 
"we have no concerns at all" [World Bank Watch January 
15, 1990]. This may be connected to the fact that the 
Freeport project is being partly insured against political risk 
by the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), 
an institution associated to the World Bank. 
One exploitative, pollutive, multinational mining project 
is already one too many for West Papua. If investors take 
up Jakarta's offer to open new mines, the violation of land 
rights, the destruction of the environment and the 
oppression of the people of West Papua will intensify. * 
More information requested 
T APOL is trying to build up a store of infor-
mation on mining in West Papua and its 
impact. Please contact us if you can contribute 
information. 
OLITICS 
Bultek, the name of the game 
The issue of succession continues to dominate Indonesian politics. The issue often assumes different 
forms. The latest is now known as Bultek, or kebulatan tekad (unanimous resolve). Although it may 
sound very innocent, the Bultek controversy has become quite explosive. Radical shifts in the political 
scene in Jakarta can largely be explained at present by the tussle over Bultek 
The term Bultek is not a new invention. The concept was 
initiated in the seventies by 'master schemer' General Ali 
Murtopo to secure Suharto's victory in the general elections. 
It is used in Indonesian politics as a device to engineer 
public opinion; the more scientific term is rekayasa (social 
engineering). An issue can be created by rallying support, 
with groups making statements and pledges of support. In 
Indonesia's formal political institutions, almost everything 
is socially engineered. GoJkar rallies, mass meetings and 
pledges are devised by the authorities and instructions sent 
out. Since the death of Ali Murtopo and the decline of his 
CSIS think-tank, the term Bultek has fallen into disuse. But 
in April, a group of 21 men, all of them top-ranking 
religious figures known as ulama (religious scholars), issued 
a bultek which exploded on Jakarta like a bombshell. 
The group of 21 
The bultek was signed on 30 September 1989 for release 
just prior to the next presidential elections in 1993. It 
endorsed Suharto for another term, his sixth. It was 
intended to have a snowball effect; following its announce-
General Alamsyah meeting the ulamas. 
ment, another two bultek came out, one by artists and one 
by more than 100 ulama in East Java. The initial group of 
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21 had been recruited by General Alamsyah. a man with a 
very colourful career. Originally from South Sumatra, he 
was involved in the 1950s PRRI regional rebellion, but 
withdrew at the last moment. He was transferred to Jakarta, 
where he became acquainted with Colone) Suharto, the 
future president. After 1965, Alamsyah became part of the 
infamous SPRI, better known as Suharto's kitchen cabinet. 
After some grave mistakes, Suharto send him off to become 
ambassador in the Netherlands but called him back to 
become Minister for Religious Affairs in 1978, the first 
time a non-ulama, and a general to boot, had held this 
post. After one term, Alamsyah moved up to become 
Coordinating-Minister for People's Welfare. He is fond of 
the limelight and perhaps hopes that by doing Suharto a 
great favour he will be rewarded with the position of Vice-
President. The present holder is General Sudharmono, much 
disliked by the generals at ABRI headquarters. Alamsyah's 
move fits in with changing political patterns. The president 
is graduaUy losing his grip over army generals and his other 
pilJar, the GOLKAR, is also showing greater independence 
from the executive. The only political force left are the 
Muslims, who since the birth of the Indonesian republic, 
have taken a back seat in political affairs. In the last two 
years, prospects have never been so bright for the Muslim 
political establishment with Muslim intellectuals focusing 
attention on economic and political issues. The notion of 
Muslim backwardness is fading, with Muslims occupying 
many senior posts in the administration, among university 
lecturers and NGO activists. 
Suharto is anticipated these developments by accom-
modating these Muslim aspirations. The acceptance of the 
Religious Courts Bill in 1989 was the fust indication of 
Suharto's shift in the power game. The bill, opposed by 
Christians, was pushed through parliament by the govern-
ment, recognising Islamic law in matters like marriage and 
divorce, inheritance and gifts. Suharto's current flirtation 
with Muslims has forced the generals to cast wary eyes. 
The 'group of 21' includes leaders of MUI, Maje/is Ulama 
Indonesia, the Muslim Scholars Council and other 
organisations like NU, MDI, Muhammadyah, Jamyatul 
Muslimin, Dewan Masjid and others. The MUI is the 
highest Muslim religious authority with a lot of political 
clout. The reaction of other Muslim leaders was negative. 
PPP chairman, Buya Ismael Metareum and NU Chairman, 
Abdurrachman Wahid, refused to become involved in the 
bultek political game. 
The anti-Bultek forces 
The "statement of the 21" caused quite some turmoil. 
Golkar leaders like General Wahono and Rachmat Witular 
expressed disapproval saying that Golkar had no intention 
to engineer statements like this. Similar statements came 
from the two other political parties, PPP and PDI. An 
Indonesian president is not directly elected by the people, 
but is appointed by the MPR, the People's Congress. Many 
bultek opponents argue that the presidential candidacy is a 
matter for the MPR and should not become a political issue. 
Everybody knows this is all just shadow-play. Many want 
Suharto to step down and attempts to prolong his rule as 
advocated by bultek champions, will be met with hostility. 
But strangely enough, the succession debate is b~ing kept 
aJive by the president himself. So far he has not g~ven any 
signal that he wants another term, but nor has he .given any 
sign that he will step down in 1993. It was his famous 
remark in his autobiography, that he would be too old for 
the job in 1993, that instigated whole succession contro-
versy. So far, Suharto has channelled his views through 
AdmiraJ Sudomo, the Coordinating Minister for PoJiticaJ 
and Security Affairs who has said that Suharto does not 
want to be president for life and will leave it to the MPR. 
The cunning president has never publicly displayed any 
eagerness to hang on to the top executive position, ~hich 
makes things more difficult for those who are agamst a 
sixth term for Suharto. They can't accuse Suharto of being 
power crazy, yet so far no candidates have emerged or have 
dared to express an interest in standing for president. 
President Suharto with young officers: how far can he 
trust them? 
What about ABRI? 
In contemporary Indonesian politics, the views of Suharto 
and the armed forces are still the ones that count. Political 
watchers have been eagerly waiting signs from top ABRI 
generals regarding bultek. In the end it came, like a volley 
of shots, from three generals in a row. General Murdani, 
Minister of Defence, came first, stating that the public 
should be wary of kebulatan tekad. He cautioned MPR 
fractions against being wrongly influenced by statements 
and called for bultek statements to be withdrawn. 
Stronger remarks came from Lieut. General Harsudiono 
Hartas, the present ABRI chief-of-staff for social and 
politicaJ affairs. Seen as spokesperson for the new gener-
ation of officers, the influence of General Hartas is far-
reaching. Speaking to a gathering of city mayors and 
district chiefs, he lambasted bultek moves for being contrary 
to the Pancasila political system. He told the political 
wee~y 1!-di~or, that bultek moves do not encourage demo-
cratlc thmking; on the contrary, they create pressure groups. 
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He therefore opposed 'extra-parliamentary' activities and 
said the presidential elections should be left to the members 
of the next MPR. As a member of the general staff, he will 
automatically be a member of the MPR. Going even one 
step further, Hartas claimed that ABRI already has a candi-
date to replace Suharto, should he decide to stand down. 
Three months prior to the 1993 MPR session, the ABRI 
leadership would have discussions with the president to 
discuss possible changes. Back in 1988, much to the dismay 
of the generals, Suharto . gave the vice-presidency to 
Sudharmono. Hartas and a large part of the officer corps are 
giving clear signals to Suharto. Their message is: we will 
support you if you deliver, ie. give ABRI a reasonable 
share in power and wealth; if not we have our own candi-
date. Political games like bultek will not be tolerated. 
General Try Sutrisno went one step further and said that 
IPOLITICS 
bultek statements are against the 1945 constitution, creating 
polarisation. Sutrisno was speaking to a DPR commission; 
his strong language towards 'the group of 21' was seen as 
a serious warning. General Try has always been regarded as 
Suharto's lapdog and served as his personal aide in the 
1970s. His engineering background has alienated him from 
the other generals, most of whom are graduates of AMN, 
the military academy. His appointment as commander-in-
chief was Suharto's doing and for some time the other 
generals at HQ regarded him with distrust. This statement 
has brought him back into the lap of mother ABRI. Could 
he be the candidate General Hartas was talking about? And 
even acceptable for Suharto? * 
rECONOMICS 
IGGI, business as usual 
The 33rd conference of the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia in The Hague in June produced 
no surprises. The Indonesian government was praised for its economic performance, its sound macro 
economic management and measures to deregulate the economy. Expectations fu.elled by IGGI 
chairman, Jan Pronk, that human rights would be raised, came to naught. There was no trace of aid 
being linked to human rights. The IGGI is, as ever, interested only in aid, finances and macro 
economic matters. Issues like human rights are relegated to the corridors. 
Dutch Development Aid Minister, Jan Pronk, had promised, 
during his visit to Indonesia in .April, that a joint initiative 
would be taken on human rights. The pledge was chal-
lenged by Foreign Minister, Hans van den Broe~, whose 
voice eventua11y prevailed in the Dutch cabinet. It was 
simply left to Pronk to say, at the time of the IGGI meet-
ing, that human rights was a matter for individual countries 
to raise. 
Indonesian refu.gees demonstrating in Amsterdam at the 
time of Pronk's departure for Jakarta. 
The figures 
IGGI assistance will this year reach US $4.5 billion in 
comparison with US$ 4.3 billion last year. Special assist-
ance will amount to US$ 1.2 billion, part of which is 
included in the above total Indonesia's fear that IGGI aid 
would be slashed proved to be groundless. Western aid to 
Eastern Europe did not affect the IGGI; as Chairman Pronk 
said: "The economic climate in Indonesia at present is far 
more favourable than in Eastern Europe" [Tempo, 23 June] 
Special assistance, widely discussed in the last few 
months, fell from US$ 1.8 bilJion last year to US$ 1.28 
billion. This is used to support the annual budget and to 
provide rupiah financing for many development projects. As 
in previous few years, Japan and the IBRD (World Bank) 
are the maJor donors. Japan pledged US$ 1,310 million, in-
cludmg US$ 500 million special aid and another US$ 200 
million outside the IGGI. The IBRD will provide US$ 
1,550 million, including US$ 250 million special assistance. 
Another major donor is the Asian Development Bank with 
US$ 900 million, . 'including US$ 250 million special 
assistance. Other bilateral assistance has fallen and Italy and 
Finland have dropped out altogether. 
In his opening speech, Pronk praised the Suharto govern-
ment for overcoming the difficult years of recession during 
the eighties. The sharp increase in non-oil exports will free 
Indonesia from its past dependence on oil revenues. Lower 
oil prices have acted as an incentive to do better. Non-oil 
exports now account for two-thirds of total exports, as 
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against a mere 20 per cent during the recession years. 
The World Bank and lMF reports both speak of lndone-
sia's buoyant performance in 1989, reflected in a 7.3 per 
cent real growth of GDP. The financial agencies want 
lndonesia to continue current policies which include a 
balanced budget, an increase in domestic savings and 
investment, and incentives to the private sector. Priority 
should be given to creating jobs, sound environmental 
management and sustained agricultural production. 
The poverty discussion 
But this jubilant mood did not prevail throughout. Pronk's 
traditional focus on supporting the poorest in society 
became the title of his opening speech: 'The right not to be 
poor is the most basic human right' . Discussion about 
poverty is a never-ending story. A recent World Bank 
document 'lndonesia, Poverty Assessment and Strategy 
Report", states that the lndonesian government has brought 
down the percentage of people below the poverty line from 
60 per cent in 1970 to 17 per cent in 1987. Pronk called the 
figures 'too flattering' because huge numbers are just above 
the poverty line. Critics of the World Bank go further, 
claiming that the gap between rich and poor has never been 
as wide as now. One criticism comes from the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP). For two decades, 
the world has relied on one source of comparative statistics 
to judge Third World countries - the World Bank's World 
Development Report. The UNDP has now issued its own 
report, using social indicators which are ignored by the 
World Bank. The UNDP has produced a measurement 
caJled the Human Development Index which challenges 
World Bank data. 
The UNDP report, drafted by a team led by Mahbub ul 
Haq, a former Pakistani Minister of Finance, is not confined 
to economic indicators but is based on a quality of life 
indicator which includes two major factors: life expectancy 
and adult literacy. lnstead of using unrealistic, nominal 
exchange rates, the UNDP has produced a purchasing 
power parity model which estimates spending power by 
comparing the costs of the same goods in various countries. 
ln this Human Development Report, lndonesia rates rather 
poorly, with a Human Development Index (HDI) of 0.591, 
below El Salvador (HDI 0.651), Sri Lanka (HDI 0.789) or 
Mongolia (HDI 0. 737). Indonesian technocrats should not 
Continued from page 1 
But now, there is another crucial difference. The network 
of human rights organisations inside lndonesia has changed 
beyond recognition. NGOs exposing individual human 
rights - imprisonment, torture, disappearances, unfair trials, 
executions - have built coalitions with NGOs campaigning 
for land rights and environmental protection and with 
student activists who organise solidarity for people being 
driven from their land. This inevitably makes our workload 
greater; more activism at home means more solidarity 
actions abroad. 
be so smug about pats on the back from the World Bank. 
Still, the World Bank remains loyal to its own dollar 
poverty indicator in its latest World Development Rep?rt, 
published in July 1990. The Bank does takes a mor~ cntical 
look at the impact of its strategies on the poorest m many 
Third World countries, referring to the eighties as the 'lost 
decade' for poor nations, and acknowledging that market 
forces 'have failed the poorest in the poorest countries.' 
However, lndonesia, along with Malaysia and Thailand, is 
held up as a beacon of suc~ssful poverty red~ction to 
guide other countries. ln countnes such as lndonesia, where 
a two-pronged strategy of labour-intensive growth and 
provision of basic health facilities . has been pu.rsued, 
claimed World Bank chief economist Stanley Fischer, 
introducing the report, " . .income-earning opportunities 
have been created for the poor and ... the poor have been 
able to respond and have participated fully in the benefits 
of economic growth .. . ". [The Independent 16 July, 1990) 
This contrasts with the less positive UNDP assessment 
and conflicts directly with the evidence of how the poor are 
further marginalised by the development process in lndo-
nesia, presented by the lndonesian NGO Infight. 
'In the margins' 
TAPOL. along with the Dutch lndonesia Committee, 
INDOC and the Movement for Basic Human Rights in 
lndonesia, sent a petition, to the IGGI chairman, in advance 
of this year's meeting. It supported the representations made 
to him by Infight, and listed a number of other concerns. 
[See TAPOL Bulletin No 99, June 1990) 
ln reply to the petition which TAPOL also sent to the 
British Foreign Secretary, Foreign Office Minister, Tim 
Sainsbury said: 
We know from our own discussions both with EC member 
states and the Indonesians that the Indonesians are aware 
of the strength of international opinion on the need to 
respect human rights. We shall continue to watch develop-
ments closely and to make representations to the Indonesian 
authorities as circumstances demand. You will wish to know 
that our delegate at the IGG/ made representations to the 
Indonesians in the margins of the meeting. (Minister of 
State) Lord Brabazon has recently visited Indonesia during 
which he also took the opportunity to remind the 
Indonesian Foreign Minister of the lively concern in this 
country about the protection of human rights and about 
East Timor. * 
But what about the Suharto regime, born out of the 1965-
66 massacres which left so many hundreds of thousands of 
people dead? That massacre, the most heinous atrocity of 
them all, is now, at last, after a quarter of a century, coming 
under international scrutiny, foJlowing exposures about the 
US role. For 25 years, lndonesia has had at its helm a man, 
surrounded by accomplices, guilty of one of the worst 
crimes against humanity in the twentieth century. If we, in 
our second 'century', can help bring these criminals to 
justice, it will have been a fight well worth while. i' 
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WEST PAPUA.':·· 
Border clashes 
There have been fresh incursions by Indonesian troops from 
West Papua into Papua New Guinea, allegedly in pursuit of 
members of the Papua Freedom Organisation (OPM). One 
report from Port Moresby, PNG on June 26, said a large 
number of Indonesian troops, estimated to be up to battalion 
strength, crossed the border near Yapsei, a remote govern-
ment post on the headwaters of the Sepik River, about 130 
km south of Jayapura. The June 26 incursion followed an 
incident a few days before, when a number of Indonesian 
troops crossed the border in pursuit of OPM guerrillas who 
had attacked an outpost in Batum. Far Eastern Economic 
Review [July 5, 1990] quotes a report which suggests the 
OPM kidnapped two Indonesian soldiers, thus prompting 
the troops to cross the border in force the second time. 
Sources in Jakarta said there had been rumours of a sizeable 
operation against the OPM in June, mounted with the 
support of paratroops in the vicinity of Y apsei. One group 
of about two hundred West Papuan refugees and another of 
seven hundred are reported to have fled across the border 
as a result of the clashes. 
Right of Pursuit 
PNG troops were rushed to the border following the 
incursion by Indonesian troops, and a company was said to 
be on standby in case the situation deteriorated further. 
There was no official comment from the PNG government 
who preferred, perhaps, to avoid setting back friendly 
relations with Indonesia. There is no agreement between the 
two countries giving lndonesia right of pursuit into PNG. 
However, since no official protests have been made by Port 
Moresby over this and other incidents in recent times, there 
may well be an unofficial understanding allowing lndonesia 
to pursue OPM into PNG. 
PNG's lndonesia-friendly policy is evident in one of the 
few mentions of the incident in the Indonesian press. 
Jakarta Post [4 July, 1990] quotes PNG Foreign Minister 
Michael Somare as telling OPM members to "cause trouble 
in your own country, not in ours". ln what is described as 
.. .... 
=:-: ~ 
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WEST PAPUA 
his most strongly-worded statement to date, Somare said: 
"I have also given the undertaking that if they cause trouble 
to PNG, they should be sent back to where they belong." 
Asylum-seekers on trial 
Four West Papuans who also failed to gain PNG sympathy 
are reported to be on trial in Jayapura. The four, plus one 
woman and two children, entered the PNG consulate in 
Jayapura last December in an attempt to seek political 
asylum, following an Indonesian government crackdown on 
a planned pro-independence demonstration. After days of 
apparent indecision, the seven were handed over to the 
Indonesian police. [See TAPOL Bulletin No 98, April 1990] 
The demonstration took place on the anniversary of the 
1988 declaration of independence by Dr Thomas Wainggai. 
Dr Wainggai, his wife and many other participants were 
arrested. Dr Wainggai and his Japanese-born wife, jailed 
for twenty and eight years respectively, were 'Prisoners of 
Conscience' of the week in the London-based newspaper 
The Independent [May 28, 1990]. ¥-
IJS Amb~~~dor's opinion. o~ WeSt Papua . . 
. ln a response ·to ·· a question , abOtit West Papila from . 
the Committee on Foreign relations; 12 May 1989, 
'the then new us· Ainba~dor to Iildonesfa~ . John 
··· ... Monjo .saidtbat the "peop,le in that part of the 'world, 
, so~e. of whom ¥C virtually stoJ1e:...age .. J.>e9Ple, •• ~ .. · ,. 
' might do better" from living \Vith Javatl;ese :a11d 
• Balinese transmigrants who are .~fairly advanced .. in · 
; their farming tCcbnique8~' . . He appeared .to be ·quite 
· ignorant ···· or the _oomplex . and ·· highly pro\llematie ; 
·. history of transfuigrants · tilting · over · the land of · 
.··.•. traditional owners. [West Papua Update; June ~990f 
Stop press 
A senior leader of the OPM, the Free Papua Movement, has 
been deported to lndonesia by the Papua New Guinea 
government. Mecky Salosa was taken under custody by 
plane from Port Moresby to V animo, driven by a police van 
to the border and handed over to Indonesian officials. 
Denouncing the move, OPM spokesperson in Port Moresby, 
Martianus Kambu, has expressed fears for Salosa's life . 
The deportation follows a statement by PNG Foreign 
Minister, Michael Somare that West Papuan 'trouble-
makers' would be handed over to Indonesia. However Mr 
Somare has not protested at recent lndonesian troop 
incursions into PNG. Somare was to meet Indonesian 
Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, the week after Salosa's 
deportation to discuss the border situation. The deportation 
can be seen as a sign of 'good will' from Port Moresby. 
TAPOL has strongly condemned the deportation in a letter 
to Michael Somare and said the PNG government must be 
held responsible for the consequences. (The Age, 23n/90] 
TAPOL Bulletin No. 100, August 1990 15 
ORESTRY-
Fighting for the fores ts 
The debate over forests heated up at the latest International Tropical Timber Organisation meeting in 
May. Gathered at the Bali Beach Hotel, were the World's timber trade elite, from consumer and 
producer nations who promised to limit the timber trade to timber from sustainable sources only, by 
the year 2000. Indonesian and international NGOs who travelled to Bali in order to lobby against the 
well-documented excesses of the logging companies over the world, are deeply sceptical that this can 
be achieved. Especially when Indonesian Forestry Minister Hasjrul Harahap claims that logging in 
Indonesia is already sustainable - the rate of deforestation in Indonesia has now reached at least one 
million hectares a year. The timber elite enjoyed tight security courtesy of the Indonesian military and 
police, who suppressed a demonstration by environmentalists in the hotel lobby. Inside, timber 
Indonesia s timber tycoon par excellence, 'Bob' Hasan, was claiming that Indonesia s forests were being 
exploited 'for the peoples welfare'. This thread-bare justification has always been wheeled out on 
public occasions to counter foreign critics, while within Indonesia, Harahap himself openly admits that 
the timber trade is in the grip of an increasingly small number of conglomerates and that many do not 
abide by the forestry regulations. Now the government faces a direct challenge from within its ranks, 
as one outspoken government official inAceh says he will resign if Jakarta hands out any more logging 
concessions in Southeast Aceh. 
South Aceh Bupati threatens to resign 
In mid-June, South Aceh district head Sayed Mudhahar 
Ahmad took the unprecedented step of threatening to resign 
from his post if the government permitted logging company 
PT Dina Maju to extend its forest concession by 100,000 
hectares. He believes, as do many residents of South Aceh 
district, that the company's activities have already lead to 
increased flooding in the area, saying "I cannot imagine 
what the future of the local people will be if all the forests 
of South and West Aceh are completely destroyed by 
concession holders". [Jakarta Post June 25, 1990] 
Ahmad's stand, which came after previous attempts with 
his seniors in the government apparatus had failed, has won 
the support of the provincial Muslim scholars [ulamas] 
council, who urged the government to take stern measures 
against reckless loggers. Minister of Home Affairs General 
Rudini, academics from Gadjah Mada University, members 
of the House of Representatives, and forestry NGO SKEPHI 
have all backed the statement. Lined up against the out-
spoken official are provincial government officials and the 
timber lobby. Neither group has been shown in a good light 
by the Bupati's statement. The deputy governor of Aceh 
was happy to let Ahmad resign, while making it known he 
thought the matter was rather trivial. Hedging his bets, 
Minister of Population and Environment Emil Salim warned 
against taking sides before it was discovered whether the 
new concession lay in a production forest or in a protected 
forest area. [To flood victims this technicality can hardly be 
relevant.] 
According to government data, there are now 10 conces-
sion-holders logging in about 600,000 hectares of forest 
concessions in South and West Aceh. Around 60% of the 
forest resources have already been exploited. Flooding in 
the two districts has swept away people, their homes and 
their belongings. Ahmad's move has certainly landed the 
government and Forestry Minister Hasjrul Harahap, who is 
responsible for withdrawing licences, in a sticky situation. 
There have been frequent attacks from outside on the 
excesses of Indonesia's logging companies, but this is a 
challenge from inside which might not so easily be ignored. 
Timber tycoons and NGOs at ITTO 
Pomp and ostentatious displays of wealth were the order of 
the day at May's International Tropical Timber meeting in 
Bali. Delegates from the world's tropical-timber producing 
and consuming nations, who preside over the destruction of 
tropical forests and the impoverishment of forest-dwellers 
all over the globe, were flown in a specially chartered jet 
from Bali to Jakarta to be received by President Suharto 
and to hear his opening speech. After a lavish banquet, they 
were jetted back again to Bali. 
Appropriately, it was during the speech of Bob Hasan, 
Indonesia's most powerful timber tycoon, that Indonesian 
students and activists decided to stage their demonstration 
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FORESTRY 
against the destruction of Indonesia's forests by logging 
companies. No sooner had they unfurled their banners in 
the hotel lobby however, than they were surrounded by 
plain clothes police and the protest was put to an end. 
Indonesia, as ITTO host, was clearly trying to limit as far 
as possible anything which contradicted information 
contained in the various glossy brochures issued by the 
forestry ministry. These told how Indonesia's forests are 
sustainably exploited for the welfare of the people. If 
outright protest was suppressed, there was at least one 
outlet for an alternative view: press releases and newsletters 
issued by Indonesian and international NGOs. In one press 
release representatives of NGOs including Japan Tropical 
Action Network, Survival International, SKEPHI, World 
Rainforest Movement, Rainforest Action Network, 
Rainforest Information Centre and Friends of the Earth, 
caHed for a moratorium on the Jogging of primary forests, 
while condemning the ITTO for its failure to address the 
impact of commercial Jogging on the lives of mi11ions of 
people who live in or around tropical forests. The three 
forestry projects approved by the mo for Indonesia were 
criticized by NGOs, and the UN-sponsored Tropical Forest 
Action Plan for Indonesia was rejected as rigid and dog-
matic. 
tribal land in Merauke, West Papua, the abandoned joint 
venture partner PT Astra, has been looking for a replace-
ment. There have been rumours on the one hand, that 
Japanese, Taiwanese and Korean companies are preparing 
to fill Scott's shoes, and on the other, that Scott is still 
involved in the project. Indeed the Malaysia-based World 
Rainforest Movement recently challenged Scott to explain 
the continued involvement of Scott's Barry Kotek, director 
of the Astra-Scott joint venture and other evidence which 
contradicts the company's announcement of withdrawal in 
October 1989. 
Indonesian companies to take Scott's place? 
Ever since US-based Scott Paper company withdrew from 
the planned pulp plant/eucalyptus plantation project on 
The latest "strong rumour", reported in the Far Eastern 
Economic Review [June 28) is that two Indonesian con-
glomerates wilJ be joining the project. They are the Sinar 
Mas Group, which already has substantial experience of the 
pulp and paper industry through one of its companies, PT 
Indah Kiat - Indonesia's largest producer of pulp and paper 
- and PT Barito Pacific, Indonesia's biggest plywood 
producer. Indah Kiat, which is part-owned by two 
Taiwanese companies, and PT Astra, Indonesia's second 
largest conglomerate, have both floated shares on the 
Jakarta stock exchange, Indah Kiat's being the biggest ever 
initial public share offering in Jakarta. PT Barito's share 
offering later this year is expected to ecJipse PT Indah Kiat. 
At US $654 milJion, the project abandoned by Scott will 
not be easy to finance, however: it would have been 
Indonesia's largest foreign investment outside the oil and 
gas sector to date. * 
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 
Reprinted from the Washington Post, June 13, 1990 
President Suharto ?s Rise to Power 
The .May·21 ·States New ·Service 
report 'that .appeared in The 'PC6t 
belatedly . drew .attention .to .the role 
U.S. officials played .in the massacres 
that accompanied President Suharto's 
riseto power- in Indonesia in 1965. 
However outraged one may be to 
read of U.S. Embassy staff supplying 
lists •and ticking .·off names ·as ·reports 
,were TeceivecHhat named-individuals 
bad been . dealt with, it .is hardly a 
smprise. . The ·.Il .S. .administration. of 
the· time .. .made. no :secret of its .relief 
that thelndonesian Communist P.arty, 
and -with it numerous left-wing orga-
nizations, · had been disposed of, even 
.at the cost of so many lives. 
In his June 2 letter to 'The "Post, 
former Foreign Service officer .Rob-
ert J. Martens tried to justify bis 
decision ·. to . pass on lists -0f names to 
the Indonesian military,,while.alleging 
that other -embassy ..staff members 
were blameless in the affair. But Mr. 
Martens's efforts to.protect the em-
bassy won't'WaSb. 
.A· recently · 1>11blished ~ of 'the 
cable traffic.between.the U.S. Embas-
sy -m Jakarta and the State 'Depart-
ment during October of 1965 (Gabriel 
Kolko, ~Confronting · the Third World: 
U.S." Foreign Policy 1945-1980") pro-
vides.far.more convincing proof of the 
·embassy's complicity ;than :Mr. :Mar-
-tens's relatively piffling list .of 5,000 
people. (After .an, .:according : to :the 
'1tlost ·conservative ·estimate, .250,000 
pOOple .were killed.) 
It is on record, for:instance; that-on 
Oct. 28, .1965, Ambassador Marshall 
.Green cabled-Secretary-of .State Dean 
.Rusk that, despite J>resident Sutcar.: 
no's efforts to stop .the slaughter, the 
••cleanup"..of the PKI.would go on.1'he 
·secretary of ·state . replied the ..next 
day-that tbis'"'campaign against PKI" 
· rnust continue, ·because "'the. military 
are ·only force :capable of creating 
order .in Indonesia." A few weeks 
later, lndonesian.generaJS-approacbed 
the United--States 'for 'CQUipment "'to 
arm Moslem .and wtionalist -youths 
for use in central Java .against the 
PKI." Washington responded by· sup-
plying covert--aid,.dispatcbedas~­
.icines:" 
The States New Service-articlews 
.important in that it raised in .a. public 
forum · the ·u.s. role in .the tragedy 
that . befelLlndoneaia .in 1965 • .It aJso 
made plain that the.JD8S&llcres.in;Jn-
donesia -were part ·of ,a ·ileliberate 
policy initiated .and implemented on 
the instrUctions IOf "Maj. ,Gen. (now 
President) Suharto. Once 1he -.orld 
. begins to comprehend the enormity of 
that ·crime, maybe President Suharto 
will atJast be called to account. 
Certainly, those ·of.. us who have 
worked:for-years :to•expose t.be ·true 
nature .-::of .· the Jakarta :-regime '.'WOUid 
like to ~ :U.S . . officials called to 
.account. But they .are now retired, 
while Mr.'Subarto·is still president of 
Indonesia. lt -is ·far 1D0re ·important 
·that he ·not be ,allowed, like Joeeph 
Stalin, to pass· into history before the 
extent of bis crimes is acknowledged. 
CARMELBUDlARDJO 
~...., . 
................... c...-.. 
'ThomtonHeatb,1JDited Kingdom 
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STUDENT TRIALS 
New subversion trial in Yogyakarta 
Bonar Tigar Naipospos, a student of social and political sciences at Yogyakarta~ Gadjah Mada 
University, is on trial for subversion, more than a year after he was arrested. His trial follows the 
convictions of Bambang Subomo and Bambang Jsti Nugroho, who are serving seven and eight year 
sentences on similar charges. 
Bonar's trial is already turning into a major political event. 
Many hundreds of people are attending the hearings, with 
crowds overflowing into the road outside. Seven experi-
enced lawyers, four from the Bar Association (lkadin), two 
from Legal Aid Institutes in Jakarta and Yogyakarta, and 
one from the Institute for the Defence of Human Rights 
(LPHAM), have joined his defence team. Hundreds of 
people, mainly students, attended the fust sessions to hear 
the indictment and to cheer Bonar along as he read out his 
hard-hitting demurrer (eksepsi). 
Bonar was arrested in June 1989 and was held in deten-
tion for a year before charges were made in court. He is 
accused of transgressions against the state ideology, 
Pancasila, by advocating Marxism-Leninism, of exerting 
influence on Bambang Isti Nugroho, coordinator of the 
Palagan Social Studies Discussion Group, of lending him 
books entitled Ditengah Pergola/can (In the Midst of 
Upheaval) and Ringkasan Sejarah Perjuangan Marxisme 
dan Komunisme (A Brief History of the Struggle of Marx-
ism and Communism) and of encouraging groups of people 
to sell books by the author, Pramoedya Ananta Toer. He is 
also accused of engaging in activities likely to provoke 
hostility and unrest in the community. These are the 'crimes' 
for which Bonar is facing charges under the draconian anti-
subversion Jaw which provides for sentences of great 
severity, including the death penalty. 
At the trial, the accused asked for facilities to continue to 
work on his masters thesis. An earlier challenge from his 
lawyers calling for his detention to be declared illegal, was 
rejected by the court. 
In the service of idiots 
In his opening defence statement (eksepsi), Bonar accused 
the public prosecutor of acting blindly at the bidding of his 
superiors and of failing to understand the contents of the 
indictment which he had just read out. When Bonar asked 
the public prosecutor to summarise the indictment after 
reading it out because he - the defendant - was unclear 
about many points, the prosecutor was unable to do so. It 
was reminiscent of Kafka's The Trial; the victim could get 
no-one to tell him why he had been arrested right up to the 
end. 
Bonar said he had never possessed copies of the two 
books he was said to have Jent to Bambang Isti Nugroho, 
and in any case, neither book had ever been banned by the 
authorities. The author of one of the books was a frequent 
contributor to Kompas; why had he not been charged? The 
two articles mentioned in the indictment, one about the 
middle classes and one about students preparing themselves 
for the elections, had been published in journals several 
years ago yet no action had been taken against the journals. 
If giving people copies of books by Pramoedya was 
tantamount to 'disseminating Marxism-Leninism', why 
hadn't the writer and his publishers been charged? He 
compared the prosecutor to a cheating school-boy who 
copies answers to questions from an older boy (his superior) 
in front, without having the slightest idea what it all means. 
'The prosecutor is to be congratulated for his creativity in 
producing an indictment that only the mentally sick, idiots 
or his superiors can understand.' 
Bonar was accused of spreading 'hostility, unrest and 
disruption among the people' in 1986 and 1987 by means 
of discussions on campus and his work with the legal aid 
group, KSBH. Yet Yogyakarta had remained calm, while 
the Defence Minister and the chief of Bakin said many 
times that there were no security disturbances. How could 
the public prosecutor today, three years later, allege that 
disturbances had occurred? 'Surely the prosecutor, not me, 
should now be on trial, because many students are very 
disturbed to hear that discussions on campus can be 
regarded as subversive.' 
Many quite absurd things had happened, said Bonar, since 
he was arrested. When troops of the Jakarta military 
command arrested him - without a warrant - he was told 
they needed some expJanations, 'yet from 9 am tilJ 4 pm the 
next day I was interrogated non-stop, without once being 
told why I had been arrested'. The second absurdity was 
that he had been told he wouJd testify in the trials of the 
two Bambangs which were then under way, yet he was 
never called to testify. Third, he was said to have been 
detained by the public prosecutor yet for the first six weeks, 
he was 'interviewed', as they say, by Korem 0734 military 
command and Bakorstanasda officers. 'Does this mean that 
Korem has moved into the public prosecutor's office?' 
Many documents that were seized and were unrelated to 
the trial, including his correspondence with the Basic 
Human Rights Committee, had not been returned. It was 
part of today's 'normality' that this trial would be unfair. 'By 
alJowing a demurrer to be presented, the accused is led to 
believe that the rule of 1aw functions . . . creating the 
impression that the trial is being run in accordance with the 
correct procedures.' Yet behind this all, the judges and 
prosecutor already know how it will end, welJ in advance, 
because the sentence is the supreme legitimation for law 
enforcement agencies.' 
'Sullying our good name' 
Bonar's statement clearly hit a bull's-eye. The prosecutor 
was furious and accused him of wrongful use of his right to 
speak in court. He had sullied the court's good name and 
had tried to influence public opinion into believe there was 
no freedom in Indonesia. The accused was also attacked for 
spreading the idea that the present proceedings were 
nothing more than a 'show trial'. 
18 TAPOL Bulletin No. 100, August 1990 
EASTTIMOR · 
Fretilin flags fly in Dili 
Schoolboys and girls at schools in Carner and Becora in the 
capital, Dili raised the Fretilin flag and sang the Fretilin 
hymn, Foho Ramelau, on 17 July, the day which is suppos-
ed to be celebrated as 'integration day', when Suharto 
signed the bill fourteen years ago annexing East Timor, 
seven months after the all-out invasion. As far as we know, 
this is the first time flags have been raised in Dili as an act 
of defiance against the forces of occupation. The 
schoolchildren also shouted Viva Fretilin and other slogans 
calling for the Portuguese parliamentary mission to come to 
East Timor. 
Troops and police soon arrived on the scene and ordered 
the schoolchildren to pull the flags down, but refused to do 
so, saying they would remain aloft until sundown. Dozens 
of youngsters were then rounded up and taken away. 
Following intervention by the International Red Cross, all 
those detained except three were released. 
Waiting for the Portuguese 
Negotiations between Portugal and Indonesia for a parlia-
mentary mission to visit East Timor have been going on for 
years. After agreement was thought to have been reached 
that the mission would go in August or September this year, 
the Indonesians have now raised new problems, further 
delaying the visit. Talks between the two sides which were 
to have taken place in New York in July have now been 
postponed until September. This means that the visit cannot 
take place this year as the rainy season starts in October. 
But news from East Timor suggests that the population is 
very eager for the mission to come. The political atmos-
phere is charged with expectancy, far more so than when 
the Pope was due to come, While Timorese would certainly 
use all possible means to impress upon the Portuguese the 
need for speedy action in favour of self-determination, the 
Indonesians have been planning counter moves, ie. anti-
Portuguese raUies. The postponement of the mission proves 
that Jakarta cannot risk having a large team of Portuguese 
parliamentarians plus a sizable foreign press corps travelling 
far and wide. 
The Kapan Pulang campaign 
A campaign being waged during the past few months, 
aimed at pestering all Indonesian intruders, military or 
civilian, is the kapan pulang? ('When are you going home?) 
campaign. Initiated by the underground student movement, 
the idea has spread like wildfire, with many youngsters 
eager to take part. Kids as young as 6 years old are 
involved as well as youngsters up to their late teens, This 
is the same age-group as those participating in the 
Palestinian intifada. 
No skiJJs or weapons are needed to join in. Groups of 
youngsters roam in places where many Indonesians congre-
gate, at the airport, in public offices, near garrisons or in 
the harbour, and innocently ask: Kapan Pulang, Pak? or 
Kapan Pulang, Bu? It is not difficult to imagine the 
answers they get. Indonesians there for a short stay may 
take it as a polite inquiry, but transmigrants or civil servants 
sent there for a longer period will recognise the hostility. 
The replies could be anything from "Huh? I've just arrived!" 
to "Kurang ajar!" (Cheeky brat!) Marching soldiers or 
police doing their morning calisthenics are also being chal-
lenged even though their replies are likely to be a slap in 
the face. 
Intimidation squads 
The Indonesian authorities have not yet found an answer to 
this campaign. No adults are involved and the movement is 
decentralised and spontaneous, with no leaders or 
organisers. Army intelligence has tried to disarm the 
youngsters by organising their own youth into street-gangs. 
Whenever Indonesians meet a group of East Timorese 
youngsters (whether involved in the Kapan Pulang cam-
paign or not) insults and provocations begin to fly. In May 
and June, street fights between juveniles increased enor-
mously.Thuggish-looking groups of young Moluccans and 
West Timorese started appearing in the streets of Dili. 
The air of hostility .bas recently intensified, with the East 
Timorese now resorting to more violence. Military vehicles, 
civilian cars and motorbikes owned by Indonesians are the 
primary targets; car-owners who leave their vehicle unat-
tended are likely to find the tyres slashed or the body 
dented. Armoured cars and personnel carriers are also 
frequent targets. 
Street fighting is now widespread and usually takes place 
late in the evenings. People in the capital are afraid to go 
out at night, for fear of encountering organised Timorese 
gangs or Indonesian street thugs. ... 
East Timorese youth preparing demo. [Photo: Fretilin] 
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Xanana 's wife and son speak out 
In an interview with TAPOL in Melbourne in July, Amelia Baptista Gusmao, the wife of Kai Raia 
Ximenes Gusmao, commander of the resistance army, Falintil, and Eugenio Paulo Baptista Gusmao 
(Nito), their 19-year old son, spoke about their 15-year ordeal in Dili. Amelia, Nito and his 15-year 
old sister, Zenilda Emilia (Zeni), left Dili on 20 May this year and reached Melbourne three days later. 
[Amelia sometimes referred to her husband by his nom-de-guerre, Xanana, but mostly she called him Jose; his fulJ name is 
Jose Alejandro Gusmao. They first met when she enroled at secondary school in Dili in 1965. They married in 1969. 
Could you speak about Jose's background and schooling? 
He was born in Laleia village, a short distance from Manatuto. He went to a mission school in the village, then to the seminary 
in Dare, but he was not planning to become a pastor. From Dare he continued his education in Dili, which is where we met. 
He is a lovely person, very strong-willed; he gives a lot of consideration to things and sticks to his opinion, once he has made 
up his mind. He likes reading and was always fond of writing; he used to write poetry in Tetum or Portuguese. Unfortunately, 
I have none of his writings. After we were married, he continued with his education at night-school whiJe working as a civil 
servant during the day. As the second oldest in a family of nine sons and daughters, he had to leave school and take a job with 
the Portuguese adminstration. Later he left the civil service and we were thinking of emigrating to Darwin. In fact, in 1975 
he went to Darwin for six months to look into the prospects for moving. When he returned to Dili, he took any jobs that were 
available. He wanted East Timor to be independent and joined the ASDT (which later became Fretilin) when it was set up in 
Amelia Gusmao with her two children. 
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1974. The other day, we celebrated his 44th birthday on 20 June. We all went to church. 
To church? Is he still a Catholic? 
Yes. A pastor once told me not to believe people who say that Xanana has become a communist. He has often asked the church 
to send pastors into the bush to baptise the children and perform other sacraments but the military authorities won't allow it. 
He wants to help people practise their religious beliefs in the bush. 
Nito, what do you remember about your father? 
I was only four years old when he left us on 30 November 1975, so I can't remember very much. I remember that every day 
when he came home from work, he would take me out for a walk and buy me an ice-cream. At the time he was working on 
a construction site as a labourer. They were building a hotel in Dili but the building has never been completed. 
What do you remember about his political activities during those days? 
[Amelia) He never talked about politics at home. In fact he isn't a very talkative person at all. I myself never joined the 
organisation. Sometimes he would be out till late at night in a meeting, so I'd go after him and ask him to come home. 
Were you there when Fretilin proclaimed independence on 28 November 1975? 
Yes, it was outside the Governor's office. They pulled down the Portuguese flag and unfurled the flag of East Timor. I felt very 
sad indeed and started crying. I had got so used to seeing the Portuguese flag flying that I felt very sad to see it pulled down. 
At home later that day, he consoled me. 'I understand your feelings because your father is Portuguese. Don't worry. Everything 
will be alright. Our country must be free.' Someone else might have got angry with me for reacting like this but he understood 
how I felt. 
When did he leave home? 
Two days after the proclamation, he left for Maubara in Liquisa district, saying he would be away for a week, but he never 
returned. He went to Maubara to take photos of what was happening because Indonesian troops were there. By this time, he 
was public relations officer on the Fretilin central committee. I was expecting him home the day before the invasion but he 
never came. Instead other people came - the Indonesian troops. 
Nito, do you remember anything about the invasion on 7 December? 
Yes, I remember it very vividly. It all started very early in the morning. My sister and I were asleep and mother woke us up 
saying a war had started and we must leave quickly. I looked out of the window and saw hundreds of paratroopers falling out 
of the sky. There was a lot of shooting going on, a terrible din. For the first time in my life, I felt terrified. We rushed out of 
the house to Motael Church nearby, the three of us with our maid. She had grabbed a few things. My mother carried Zeni who 
was only a year old and I ran along beside her. 
We saw many terrible things at the church. People were running in all directions, but there were Indonesian soldiers 
everywhere. To the left, I remember seeing someone being shot down and killed by the troops. To the right, I saw someone 
being arrested and beaten up. I stood looking out of the window and saw many things. At the side of the church, I saw a 
soldier chasing a Timorese and shooting at him. Then someone grabbed me and said, 'Don't stand there by the window! You 
could be hit by a stray bullet.' 
[Amelia] Later in the day, soldiers came to the church and ordered us all to come out. They divided us into two groups, the 
men on one side and the women and children on the other. The pastor stood in the middle with two Indonesians. Then the 
lndonesians asked the pastor to say who were Fretilin. The pastor said he didn't know. 'I know them all as Catholics which 
is why they rushed here. 'If you want to know who are Fretilin, ask them yourselves.' 
Behind the men, soldiers were lying on the ground with their rifles at the ready. The soldiers in the middle started giving 
orders to shoot. All the women and children were terrified; we were weeping and screaming. They didn't actually shoot anyone 
there at the church, but they took many of the men away and shot them dead at the harbour. Many others were taken to Taci 
Tolu and shot dead there. The ones taken from the church were all men but there were also some women shot dead at the 
harbour, including the wife of Nicolau Lobato. Many people who didn't manage to reach the church were taken to the harbour 
and shot. 
Didn't the pastor try to protect the people in the church? 
Yes, but there was little he could do. When the soldiers took the men away, they said they needed their help. 
We stayed at the church for several days; many of us took shelter there. But the pastor needed the church because Christmas 
was getting close so we moved to a house near the church. We stayed there for a couple of weeks but the army told us to clear 
out so we moved yet again, to another house which had been a police office under the Portuguese. After a while, some of these 
officials returned from Atambua, so we were told to move again. I had no idea where to go. I didn't have a home, my family 
wasn't there. My mother and father and all my brothers and sisters had gone to Portugal for a holiday a few months earlier and 
had not returned because of the upheavals. 
Couldn't you go back to your own home? 
No, Indonesian troops were living there. Most people's homes were taken over. We had no belongings except what we took 
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with us when we fled. We didn't get our home back for three years. When the troops took it from us, they di~ it without 
producing any documents, but when we tried to get it back, we had to produce aJJ kinds of documents to prove that it was ours, 
even documents from Portugal. 
When did they start interrogating you? d f 
I used to be harassed a lot in the first few years but things started to get really bad in 1979 w_hen Jose took over asd lea ~~ 0 
the resistance after Nicolau Lobato was shot dead in December 1978. They started summoning me almost every ay · ;_y 
aJways came for me after 9 pm and heJd me tilJ 6 the next morning even though I had two smaJl children. I would aJways 1 e 
the children with me. They were very cruel indeed, shouting at us aJJ the time. Sometimes we would be taken to an army 
office, sometimes to an officer's home. 
Carmel Budiardjo from TAPOL with Nito Gusmao. 
Almost every time, they tried to 
persuade me to write to Xanana or to 
go into the bush with them to caJJ on 
him to surrender. I refused and told 
them he had gone into the bush of his 
own free wilJ. If he wanted to come 
down, we'd all be happy, but if he 
didn't there was nothing I could do. 
This happened over and over again. 
Sometimes they said I should think of 
the children. When they grew up, they 
could continue their schooling in 
Jakarta. I told them I didn't want the 
children to go to school anywhere else 
as there were schools in Dili. The 
nights I had to spend with the intel 
were frightfuJ. Sometimes, when they 
pestered me with questions, they 
would hold a pistol to my head. 
Each time a new district military 
commander (dandim) took over, the 
whole family - the three of us and a11 
of Jose's brothers and sisters and his 
parents - were summoned to meet the 
new man. We'd have to go at 6 am. 
On these occasions, he would point to a big map of the world on the wall and say, mockingly: 'See, Portugal is very far away 
but Indonesia is very close. Don't imagine that the Portuguese can ever come back. East Timor will remain with Indonesia for 
ever.' 
You were older by this time, Nito, so I suppose you can remember this. 
Yes, I remember it very clearer. Our teachers at school also spoke like this. Although they were talking to the whole class, 
it was actually directed at me, to intimidate me, hoping that I would go home and tell mother. 
In aJl schools in East Timor, there is always an intel agent, even in primary schools. They don't wear uniform and work as 
teachers. It's easy to spot them. In aJl the villages, there's a babinsa (a non-commissioned officer) besides the village head. 
People are so poor that the soldiers entice them to spy on their neighbours by promising them money or rice in exchange for 
information. Sometimes these people are orphans, young people who lost their parents in the war. 
[Amelia] I was very frightened of these late night visits. They upset me very much and I was often ill. I used to ask people 
what I should do. I was a mother with two small children but these men were making me lose a lot of sleep every night; why 
did they come to fetch me late at night? An Indonesian advised me one day not to open the door when they came. I tried this; 
when they banged on the door, I didn't open up. But they kept on knocking and started throwing things at the door to break 
it down. There was nothing we could do; we were completely at their mercy. 
Did you go to an Indonesian school, Nito? 
Yes, I would have much preferred a Portuguese school, but things were very difficult for us as it was; I went to an Indonesian 
school so as not to make things worse for my mother. 
Amelia, were you always interrogated in Dili? 
Every time except once, when I was taken to Baucau. When they came to the house, they said my husband would be in Baucau 
so I had to go there. I would be away for three days. I got very upset. I wanted to take clothes but they said that if I needed 
anything, they would fetch them. I was very scared because at this time - it was in 1981 - many people were disappearing. 
Leopoldo Joaquim had disappeared and so had Correta. When I left home that time, I really thought it was the end for me. 
They took me to a house in Dili. I asked the officer to let me go and spend the night with my children. He refused, saying 
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I had to ]eave very early in the morning for Baucau. It was such a strange encounter. This officer never once looked me in 
the face; he always looked sideways when he spoke to me. I had to s]eep in a smalJ room with a terrible stench. I couldn't sleep 
a wink. The next morning, they took me by helicopter to Baucau but kept me there only for a few hours. 
I was taken to an officer who got angry with the soJdiers who had taken me there. He said that because I was a civil servant, 
they should have got permission first. He wanted me to go into the bush with them and tell Xanana to surrender. They said 
they were trying to make contact with him by radio. In fact, I heard them doing this in the next room, but they failed. 
Then an officer came and to]d me to write Xanana a Jetter, so I sat down and wrote one page but that wasn't enough. How 
could a wife onJy write one page to her husband, he said. I wrote another page but this still wasn't enough. They wouldn't let 
me stop until I had written four pages. Then they took me back by helicopter to Dili. 
Did you ever receive any letters from Xanana? 
Never. But I do know that he once sent me a Jetter which I was never alJowed to see. It was in 1981. The Jetter had been 
intercepted by the army. I think they found it in the possession of someone who had been arrested. I shudder to think what 
happened to him. The Jetter had been folded up so that I could see only one Jine. They asked me to identify his hand-writing, 
which I did. I asked them for a photocopy but they refused. That was the only letter I saw from him in fifteen years. Then they 
let me read that one line. It read: 'Please don't teach our children to hate me.' I have no idea what else he wrote; maybe he was 
telling me he had decided to continue the struggle. Who knows? 
Do you remember your Mother being taken away to Baucau, Nito? 
Yes, I do.It so happens I wasn't at home that evening but staying with friends. 
[Amelia] The next morning, he went to the beach for a swim and on the way he passed by the house where I was being held. 
I knew he would pass that way so I stood by the window to watch for him. I asked the soldiers to allow me to call him over. 
[Nito] I was very surprised to hear Mother caJJing me. I didn't know she had been taken away. She ca11ed me over and told 
me father was coming down from the mountains and she had to go to Baucau but she also said she didn't think she would ever 
return because so many people were dying at the time. She told me to be good and look after my sister. 
The soldiers are very sadistic. It's part of their normal behaviour. They seem to be trying to get their own back on the 
Timorese. Perhaps, back home, they behave differently but when they join the army and have to go to Timor, it's the Timorese 
who have to suffer. 
How long did they go on summoning you? 
Right up to the time we left. But the worst time was from 1979 till 1984 or 1985. It happened very frequentJy, always Jate at 
night and we had to stay there tilJ morning. They were aJways very rough and extreme]y rude. Sometimes, an officer would 
ask how we were and mother would say that it was bad for us always to be summoned late at night. After complaining, they 
started summoning us during the day for a time. Otherwise, these night-time calls would have gone on for ever. 
Was your home being watched? 
[Nito] Yes, especially when foreign guests came to Dili. Once a cousin of my father's came to Dili and visited us at home. 
Later someone to]d us that the Indonesians had taken a video of the visit in our home, through the window. A house nearby 
was occupied by inte] from Koopskam (the special operational command for East Timor). There are Koopskam offices all over 
the pJace. as welJ as in Farol, the district where we were living. Later they showed us shots from the video. Many houses in 
Faro] are now inhabited by Indonesians. The Indonesians always say that the Portuguese Jeft nothing behind, yet in Faro] there 
are many good houses built by the Portuguese which are now occupied by Indonesians. 
Our home had been occupied by Indonesian troops. They. turned the kitchen into a bedroom and the toilet and bathroom had 
been turned into a kitchen. They had the toilet and bathroom behind the house. 
[Amelia] Sometimes Indonesians would come to the house, saying that they wanted to check up on the electricity. They'd 
pretend they didn't know I was Xanana's wife. Then they would sit there, looking at me, saying, 'So this is Xanana's wife.' 
Some came in uniform but the soldiers who came at night were never in uniform, or if they wore uniform, they had no insignia 
or mark of identification. 
When the demonstration took place during Ambassador Monjo's visit, did you take part, Nito? 
No, because we were preparing to ]eave for Australia and we didn't want to spoil things. Even if this hadn't been the case, I 
wouJdn't have taken part because I was being watched very closely, much more so than anyone else. They knew all my moves. 
But after the demonstration, they summoned mother and me and starting asking me whether I had taken part. They showed 
me photos and asked whether I knew the people. I said I didn't know anyone. Someone had said I had taken part but the intel 
people knew very well that this wasn't true. 
Were special measures taken against you when foreign visitors came? 
We were always toJd to stay at home, under virtua] house arrest. When there were guests staying at the hotel, we were not 
aUowed to go there. But it's the same with anyone who has influence in the community or have been detained in the past. 
Before the Pope came, all these .. people were rounded up and detained. The same thing happened again when the US 
ambassador came to East Timor. Afterwards, they're allowed to go home. This happened when Suharto came in 1988 and soon 
after, when a minister - I forget who - came. For us, the opening up of East Timor meant more restrictions than ever because 
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whenever visitors came, we weren't allowed to go anywhere. 
When visitors come, army vehicles are painted over, the 
numberplates are changed from army to civilian numberplates. 
Once, when someone very senior from Australia came - perhaps it 
was the Northern Territories premier ... aJJ the army trucks were 
hidden away and soldiers were moved out to Taci Tolu or Areia 
Branca. At times like this, Timorese are not aJJowed to go to these 
places because many weapons are hidden there. Another trick is to 
hide their weapons in sacks. All of sudden, there are Jots of men 
carrying sacks on their backs. The kids come up and ask the 
soldiers, 'What's in the sack?' but they are shooed away and told to 
mind their own business. 
When the soldiers returned from operations in the bush, they 
behave very badly indeed. They abuse the Timorese for the things 
they have confronted in the bush. Can you imagine! They accuse 
us of taking the Jaw into our own hands which is exactly what they 
do themselves! 
Amelia Gusmao showing photos of Xanana and herself Did you hear about Murdani' s speech in Dili last 
before their marriage. February? 
Yes, he warned parents that if any demonstrations took place again when foreign visitors came, the demonstrators would be 
shot without warning. We also heard that 'mysterious killers' (Petrus) would be brought to Dili to take action against young 
people. We heard about troops called merpati putih. What I understand is that they are people trained in self-defence. All the 
commandos, troops belonging to Kopassus, are now called merpati putih. 
Do you know anything about preparations for the visit of the Portuguese parliamentarians? 
[Nito) The army has stepped up operations against the resistance in the bush. I'm quite sure too that alJ the people who've ever 
been arrested for taking part in demonstrations are being closely watched and that when the mission comes, they will be 
rounded up. I've heard that young people in Dili are wearing black, as a sign of mourning. Now some of the soldiers are also 
wearing black and are wearing wigs, so they're taken for Timorese. Not long before we left, a Timorese on guard duty was 
shot dead. He was sitting at the guard-post when a vehicle drove up and six men got out. They started to beat him up so he 
put up a fight, and they shot him dead. This happened in a village called Audian. Things like that are happening alJ the time. 
Sometimes, a soldier is attacked and beaten up by a group of people wearing black, with their faces covered. SmaJJ groups 
of soldiers patrol the streets in armoured vehicles throughout the night. If they come across a young Timorese riding a bike 
or a motor-cycle, he runs the risk of suffering a terrible fate. It's very dangerous for us to do anything against the army. If we 
try to take revenge for killings we hear about in Dili or elsewhere, they strike back very hard indeed. 
How easy was it for you to leave East Timor? 
[Amelia) It wasn't easy at all. The Indonesians put all kinds of obstacles in our way. After many difficulties, we were given 
visas to come to Australia under the family reunion programme as my parents and aJJ my brothers and sisters Jive in Australia. 
Our visa was issued on 9 September last year and was valid for six months, up to 24 April but we couldn't get permission to 
]eave. We were very worried, as you can imagine. When the visa expired and we still couldn't leave, I reaJJy thought we would 
never leave. It was so difficult to get a permit to go. Eventually when it came, the visa had already expired. I refused to leave 
because I was afraid we would not be allowed into Australia. It was only after someone from the Red Cross went to Jakarta 
to make inquiries, that we got confirmation that we would be allowed in. On 19 May, we were told to leave the next day. We 
went to Jakarta on 20 May and left for Australia three days later, with Australian travel documents. 
Why the delay? 
They kept saying that we had to wait until Xanana came down from the bush. Then we could all leave together. I told them 
he hadn't come down for fifteen years so why should he come down now. 
So even when you were preparing to leave, they kept on summoning you? 
Yes, they kept postponing our departure, saying he would be down soon. They used to say to Nito: 'You're strong and healthy. 
Why don't you join the Indonesian army?' They said I had a job and a good salary, so why not stay.'If you don't like it in East 
Timor, you can go to another province.' The whole thing made me ill. Right up to the end, they never stopped pestering me. 
[Amelia has been emotionally distraught ever since she arrived in Melbourne. Even though she was keen to tell her story, she 
often broke down. The second time we met, Nito joined us, making it much easier for her to cope. Amelia is now under medical 
supervision. Zeni is starting school soon. As the interview came to an end, the postman came with a letter for Nito, saying that 
he could start a special English-language course for immigrants. He was absolutely thrilled]. 
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Gadjah Mada report on East Timor 
In our last issue, we summarised parts of a report on East Timor by a team of social scientists from 
Gadjah Mada University. Now that we have the whole document, we can complete our summary. 
Losing the younger generation 
Indonesia's drive to win over the younger generation has 
been a flop, as reports elsewhere in this issue show. The 
Gadjah Mada research reinforces that impression. School 
children are apathetic and see no connection between what 
they learn in school and their later prospects in life. The 
]ow level of education in the villages is the result partly of 
poor social and economic conditions and an inadequate diet 
which makes many children too weak to concentrate at 
school. But many parents need their children to help them 
and are unwiJJing to Jet them go to school. In one school, 
the researchers discovered, there were never more than half 
the children at school. A fine imposed on parents did not 
help matters; the parents did not mind paying the fine to 
keep their kids at home. [p. 81) 
There is much evidence recently of rejectionism among 
youngsters in the towns, incJuding those still at school and 
those who have finished school and can't find jobs. [p.82-
83) Many teenagers are quite fearless of the army. The 
researchers speak of a recent incident when some young-
sters were arrested and 
naturally did not escape "being taught a lesson" by the 
army - their heads were immersed in water, and they were 
beaten and kicked with army boots. But this did not curb 
their spirits. They regard such physical torture as a lesser 
evil than imprisonment of the spirit by the system. 
Pressure on school-children by the military means that 
they are being imprisoned in spirit with little space to move 
and constantly restrained and watched. When these pres-
sures accumulate, it is hardly surprising for them to use 
'rejectionist forms' as a way of asserting their presence ... . 
and giving rise to tensions. This can be taken as a barom-
eter of the degree of social unrest in East Timor. [p. 84] 
The shift towards the church 
Discussing religious Jif e, the researchers say East Timorese 
live today in two worlds, with one foot in the church and 
the other foot in their native beliefs (wna lulik). In 1980, 
Catholics accounted for 17 per cent of the population, with 
almost everyone else adhering to native beliefs. Today, 
however, 80 per cent of the population are Catholics, with 
the remainder being Protestants, Muslims, Hindus or 
Buddhists (the majority of these being outsiders). The 
dramatic shift towards Catholicism is a consequence of the 
government's attitude towards native beliefs and of a 
widespread fear of being branded as communists. [p. 57) 
Only five religions are officiaJJy recognised by the 
Indonesian government; everything else is cJassified under 
the heading 'beliefs'. There is no place for people who do 
not adhere to one of the official religions. In school, aH 
children must study one of the five religions; this must also 
be specified on a person's identity card. No-one dares not 
to mention one of the religions for fear of being branded as 
having no religion. This is automatica)]y taken as meaning 
that you are an atheist, whilst atheism in Indonesia is 
equivalent to communism. The removal of Fretilin from the 
public arena in East Timor has also driven many people 
into the embrace of the church, for it is only here that they 
feel safe. [p. 57) 
The village economy 
In Portuguese times, the structure of East Timorese society 
was shaped like a pyramid, with a tiny layer of Portuguese 
officials at the top, a slightly larger layer of Chinese in 
control of the economy, and underneath, more than 98 per 
cent of impoverished, poorly-educated and powerless 
people. Today, along with the disappearance of the Portu-
guese bureaucrats, the layer of Timorese Chinese has also 
gone, only to be replaced by Chinese and other business-
men from Indonesia. This has brought its own problems, 
and history has repeated itself. 
The government ('the centreJ felt that it had a debt of 
gratitude towards PT Dhenok [sic] Hatimas Incorporated 
because it financed the war of integratwn. The huge 
concessions granted to this company has given it a monop-
oly over the economy and commerce in East Timor. As was 
the case with the Portuguese government, the East Timor 
regwnal government almost always accepts the views of the 
trader. fp. 92] 
This analysis is remarkable for several reasons: the 
researchers here and elsewhere describe many Indonesian 
policies as being a continuation of policies under the Portu-
guese. But they also distinguish between 'the civil war' and 
the 'war of integration', a term that is absent from all 
official Indonesian accounts. 
Indonesian troops building a road in East Timor. [Tempo 
January 13, 1990] 
Denok's monopsonistic position in the coffee trade is 
described at some length. Although in some districts, coffee 
is integral to people's livelihood, the stranglehold of the 
company makes it impossible for producers to earn enough 
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to raise living standards. The researchers frequently mention 
the sharp decline in buffaloes, cattle and horses, yet coffee-
growers cannot earn enough to replace the animals they lost 
during 'the upheavals'. Huge fees are paid into the various 
cooperatives in the trading chain; these payments are seen 
as 'institutionalised tribute'. Government officials are 
powerless to solve the problem, while coffee-growers 
regard cooperatives as a cover for private interests. The 
coffee price is fixed by manipulating a govemorial decree 
(SK Gubernor ). When world prices fall, the fixed price goes 
down, but when the reverse happens, the price does not 
rise, the pretext being that it takes time before the decree 
can be changed. All this gives people the sense that they 
are again being colonised. With people frustrated by a sense 
of powerless, the church is crucial to the lives of the 
people. 
Another area where the Indonesians have taken over 
where the Portuguese left off is land. In 1979 the army 
decreed that all land held by the Portuguese army should go 
to the Indonesian army and be managed by PT Salazar. 
Land in five of the 13 villages in Hatolia sub-district, 
Ermera is in the hands of this company, yet the land was 
seized by the Portuguese without the consent of the owners. 
Hence, peasants avoid working for the company, and even 
cut down or bum its trees. One case recorded by PT Salazar 
charges a man with destroying 36 coffee bushes and 5 
rubber trees because he wanted to plant his own crops on 
land he considers to belong to him. But people are too 
afraid to speak their minds. Ask them something and they 
will reply, saying not what is really true but what they are 
required to say. [p. 41] * 
Lalerek-Mu tin atrocity confirmed 
Four villagers in Lalerek-Mutin, a settlement in the vicinity 
of Viqueque which is inhabited by people who fled from 
Kraras when renewed fighting broke out between the armed 
resistance and the Indonesian army in 1983, were severely 
beaten by Indonesian troops in March this year. One of the 
men, Candido Amaral, was executed by firing-squad when 
he refused to make a false confession. 
The atrocity started when Indonesian commandos forced 
their way into the homes of two women, Teresa Amaral and 
Cristina Brandao, alleging that two men had been seen 
fleeing from their homes. The troops alleged that the two 
men were their husbands who joined the resistance in 1983. 
Although the women denied this, the troops gave chase and 
entered the home of a neighbour, Joaquim Sarmento, 
accusing him of having seen the 'intruders'. After being 
beaten unconscious, Sacramento made a false confession 
that he had indeed met Teresa's guerilla husband along with 
(J 
another Fretilin fighter. The following day, another 
Lalerek-Mutin inhabitant, Antero de Carvalho, was taken 
into custody by the troops for allegedly making contact 
with the resistance while out collecting bamboo sap for 
wining-making. After a severe beating, he too falsely 
confessed to having met four guerillas. Meanwhile, a third 
man, Sebastiao do Reis, was accused of having received a 
rifle from the village chief who was away at the time on 
business. Again, heavy beating was used to make Sebastiao 
to confess; in an attempt to stop avoid further beatings, he 
claimed that he had given the rifle to a fourth man, Candido 
Amaral and had, along with twelve other inhabitants, been 
supplying ammunition to the resistance. 
On 28 March, the troops picked up Candido Amaral 
hoping to get further false confessions out of him by similar 
beatings. But Amaral refused to confess to anything; he also 
denied that the village-head had been in possession of any 
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weapons. Even when confronted by Sebastiao, who was 
now forced to become one of his interrogators, Amaral 
denied everything. Early the next morning, Amaral was 
dragged to Tua-Metan and executed by firing-squad. His 
body was riddled with so many shots that parts of it had 
disintegrated. 
Confirmation 
Well-documented information about this atrocity from a 
very reliable source reached Australia in May and the 
documents were handed to the Australian Department of 
External Affairs. On 27 June, Foreign Minister Senator 
Gareth Evans told Carmel Budiardjo of TAPOL, who 
visited the Minister together with former Australian 
parliamentarian, Tony Lamb, and Timor activist in 
Canberra, Michael Wagner, that the atrocity had been 
confirmed. He said a local officer had been dismissed and 
that compensation had been paid to Cabral Amaral's family. 
However, the maltreatment of three men and the execution 
of a fourth man, is only part of the story sent out in May. 
The report explains how the inhabitants of Lalerek-Mutin 
came to be there in the first place. Their tragedy dates back 
to August 1983 when Indonesian troops staged an operation 
against the inhabitants of Kraras, during which many 
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women were abused and maltreated. Several thousand 
inhabitants fled the district after some of the menfolk went 
to join the resistance. After a month of hardship wandering 
in the jungle, the villagers had no option but to surrender to 
the forces of occupation. Some surrendered in Viqueque 
and some in Buikarin; many were killed when they 
surrendered; those killed in Buikarin were buried on the 
banks of the We-Tuku River. Many who surrendered in 
Viqueque were bound hand and foot and buried alive in 
Sukaer-Oan, 10 km south-west of Viqueque. 
The survivors of these two massacres were forced to re-
settle in Lalerek-Mutin, since when many more have died 
from starvation and a variety of diseases. Of the 1,553 
inhabitants still living there in October 1989, 221 had been 
widowed (191 widows and 30 widowers). They now live 
under constant guard by troops of the 86th unit based in 
Baucau. Eight commandos and 5 Timore~e para-militaries 
(fBOs) stay most of the time in the homes of Teresa and 
Cristina whose husbands have long been in the bush. 
Although the army authorities deemed it wise to confirm 
this atrocity, the Australian government should take the 
matter further and seek ways of investigating the tragic 
seven-year history of the people of Kraras. ~ 
Portugal should take Timor Gap 
Treaty to World Court 
Following the adoption by the Australian parliament of the 
Petroleum Zone of Cooperation Bill and consequential 
amendments to a number of existing laws, the only thing 
that can stop Australia from proceeding to implement the 
Timor Gap Treaty signed last December with Indonesia is 
a move by the Portuguese government to challenge the 
Treaty in the International Court of Justice. 
The bills were adopted in May in the House of Represen-
tatives without opposition; not one Labour Party (ALP) 
parliamentarian voiced objections to the legislation. (Until 
1982, the ALP supported self-determination for East 
Timor.) It was only in the Senate, where eight Australian 
Democrats have seats, plus several Independents, that the 
Treaty was strongly criticised and a number of Senators 
voted against the legislation. 
Senator Macklin, leader of the Australian Democrats, said: 
It is clear from the historical record that, in extending de 
jure recognition in 1979 to the Indonesian takeover, 
Australia was concerned primarily with opening ways for 
negotiation on the Timor Gap. It did this at the high point 
of the Timor conflict. In other words, Australia was not 
motivated by concern to help the East Timorese, but rather 
by expediting the exploration and exploitation of the vast 
resources of oil and gas that it knew lay beneath the Timor 
Gap. 
Senator Macklin recalled the wide support among Austra-
lian politicians in favour of independence for the Baltic 
states even though the forcible seizure of those territories 
occurred over 50 years ago. "However, when it comes to 
the forcible seizure of territory 15 years ago, in our part of 
the world, what do we do? We sweep it under the carpet." 
He was hopeful that Portugal would seek an opinion on 
the Treaty from the International Court of Justice. When 
Australia challenged French atomic testing in the Pacific, it 
insisted that no tests take place while the matter was in the 
hands of the Court. If Portugal brought the Treaty to the 
Court, Australia should abide by the same principle. 
Senator Jo Vallentine for the Greens of Western Austra-
lian also spoke forcefully against the Treaty. She referred 
at some length to the opinion given by three Cambridge 
international jurists [see TAPOL Bulletin, No 99).She too 
considered the implications for Australia if Portugal goes to 
the World Court. If the Court rules that the Treaty is illegal, 
"both Australia and Indonesia will have to decide whether 
or not to ignore the ruling. Such a decision would theoreti-
cally place Australia in a dilemma as it has been one of the 
few states to have voluntarily declared that it accepts the 
jurisdiction of this Court." 
It was ironic, she went on, that we were always being told 
that East Timor could not be a viable independent state 
economically yet, considering the vast oil and gas in the 
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Gap, East Timor "might have the potential to be like Brunei 
or one of the Persian Gulf states, very small, yet indepen-
dent and economically viable". 
But she warned of the environmental hazards of oil 
drilling in the Timor Sea. Oil spills could have massive 
environmental impacts on marine and coastal ecosystems in 
northern Australia, East Timor and Indonesia, she said. 
TAPOL: Portugal must act 
TAPOL wrote to President Mario Soares of Portugal on 17 
June calling on Portugal to make good its pledge last 
December "to use all legitimate means within reach to 
safeguard the rights of the East Timorese people". 
It is a matter of regret for us that, as far as we know, 
your Government has not yet done anything to put these 
words into action. Now that the Treaty has been ratified, 
we feel strongly that it is incumbent upon Portugal to 
proceed without delay and ask the International Court of 
Justice to deliver an opinion on the legality of the Treaty .... 
(T)here is no possibility for the people of East Tim.or to 
bring the matter before an international tribunal themselves 
as they lack legal standing to do so. Portugal is the only 
country in a position to act on behalf of the East Timorese. 
We feel that you should do so to preserve your own rights 
and fulfil your duties towards East Timor. 
Oil companies worried 
The managing director of Australia's leading petroleum 
company, Broken Hill Proprietaries (BHP) has expressed 
reservations about the legality of the Treaty. Brian Luton 
said that complicated legal wrangles could delay oil 
exploration in the zone of cooperation. He said no money 
would be spent in the area until companies could be 
guaranteed title. 'We are talking about very big issues here. 
Territorial disputes are common in other parts of the world 
and typically, they are very, very complicated .... if anyone 
' 
· fee]s aggrieved by whatever the rules and reguJations are, 
they will use all legal resources available to them to protect 
their interests.' [The Age, 21 June 1990] 
His fears would appear to relate primarily to the failure of 
Indonesia and Australia to resolve their dispute over the sea 
boundary between East Timor and Australia (the Timor Gap 
Treaty side-stepped that dispute) but companies can also be 
expected to be wary of sinking huge sums of money while 
the prospect of a challenge in the World Court remains .... 
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